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GOING PRIVATE: BUSINESS PRACTICES, LEGAL
MECHANICS, JUDICIAL STANDARDS AND
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
LEWIS D. SOLOMON*
INTRODUCTION
D uring the late 1960's and early 1970's over 3,000 corporations
went public for the first time.' Corporate executives sought to
bring privately held companies to the securities market to obtain pub-
licly traded paper as a means of increasing their wealth. One astute
financial writer coined the term "super-currency" 2 to describe the stock
resulting from this process.
However, amid the most severe recession since the Great Depres-
sion, public disillusionment with the nation's securities markets,8 an
acceleration of the capital needs of American corporations,4 and a
general crisis of confidence in American institutions and leadership,
numerous corporations, including many of the same entities that so
assiduously sought public shareholders only a few years ago, are search-
ing to return to the status of privately held firms by using a variety of
techniques. These going, private transactions pose a potential for harm
to minority shareholders. Consequently, these transactions raise several
difficult fiduciary problems under federal and state law which require
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri, Kansas City School of Law.
A.B., Cornell University, 1963; LL.B., Yale Law School, 1966. I acknowledge the research
assistance of Harry Pener, LL.M. candidate at the University of Missouri, Kansas City
School of Law, in the preparation of this article.
1. ee Address by Commissioner A. Sommer, Jr., "Going Private": A Lesson in
Corporate Responsibility, at the Notre Dame Law School, November, 1974, reprinted
in [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 80,010 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Sommer Address].
2. See A. SMrITH, SUPERMONEY 67-110 (1972). See also note 4 infra.
3. Solomon, Institutional Investors: Stock Market Impact and Corporate Con-
trol, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 761, 768-70 (1974). See also Cole, Institution Dollar
Volume 69% of Big Board's Total, N. Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1975, at 55, col. 2; Metz,
Market Place Investor Disenchantment Rising, N. Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1975, at 58, col.
2; Hearings on S-2787 and S-2842 Before the Subcommittee on Financial Markets of
the Senate Committee on Finance, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., at 4 (1974) ; Sommer Address.
4. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., The Capital Needs and Saving Potential Of The
U. S. Economy, Projections Through 1985 (September, 1974); see Jones, Business Cap-
ital Requirements 1974-1985, FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE, Nov., 1974, at 22; Massaro, Is
The U. S. Facing a Capital Shortage?, CoNFERENCE BOARD RECoRD, Jan., 1975, at 41.
But see LEVINSON, CAPITAL, INFLATIONr AND THE MULTINATIONALS ch. VI (1971).
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the expansion and interpretation of federal securities law as well as the
more fundmental consideration of whether federal securities law should
remain rooted in the concept of disclosure or should, instead, reach
into substantive areas including the possibility of merit regulation.
Underlying the entire controversy is the need for a reappraisal of the
duties owed by controlling interests to minority public shareholders.
In an effort to protect the integrity and efficiency of securities
markets, the Securities and Exchange Commission has undertaken an
examination of the problems of going private.5 This study will explore
the desirability of action and the limits of the SEC's power to act. How-
ever, while the Commission, corporations and shareholders are groping
for practical guidelines which will balance the benefits accruing to
majority shareholders and the detriments flowing to minority share-
holders, the application of rules under federal or state laws will con-
tinue to rest on retrospective, ad hoc interpretations by the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the courts.
After examining the reasons corporations have offered for going
private and the business and legal mechanisms involved in connection
therewith, this article will analyze the judicial response to such trans-
actions. Although going private deals may, in the future, consistently
be brought under the umbrella of rule lOb-5, 0 most federal courts
probably will not forseeably apply rule 1Ob-5 to enforce standards of
fairness unless accompanied by violations of the various disclosure
obligations. Uncertainties also exist as to the fiduciary concepts evolving
under state law.
To resolve the almost hopeless task of devising serviceable stan-
5. On September 9, 1974, the Securities and Exchange Commission announced a
Public Fact-Finding Investigation in the Matter of Beneficial Ownership, Takeovers, and
Acquisitions by Foreign and Domestic Persons. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5526,[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 79,956, at 84,460 (Sept. 9, 1974);SEC Securities Act Release No. 5538, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP. 11 80,004, at 84,611 (Nov. 5, 1974). In connection with one of the specific inquiries
of that proceeding, i.e., relating to "going private," the SEC has stated, among other
things, in its February 6, 1975, release that "the Commission has received a number of
letters from shareholders expressing concern about the fairness of so-called 'going private'
transactions, and from members of the investment community expressing concern about
the impact of such transactions on the confidence of investors in the market place."
SEC Securities Act Release No. 5567, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEa. L.
REP. f 80,104, at 85,091 (Feb. 6, 1975). In its Release of February 6, 1975, supra, theSecurities and Exchange Commission announced that it has ordered a public investiga-
tory and rulemaking proceeding, including public hearings, relating to so-called "going
private" transactions by public companies and their affiliates. Id. at 85,089. See also
text at 172-76.
6. SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974).
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dards, 7 and because traditional disclosure concepts are unsuitable to
resolving the problem, it is recommended that the Securities and Ex-
change Commision promulgate regulations enabling the Commission
to conduct an administrative hearing with respect to each corporation
seeking to "go private" prior to the consummation of the proposed
plan. After the Commission has reviewed the terms and conditions of
each proposal, it would arrive at its own recommendations, which, if
acceptable to the corporate management, would constitute the offer
to be made to the public shareholders. This procedure would remove
the sword of uncertainty and thus facilitate the planning of corporate
transactions.
I. WHY CORPORATIONs Go PRIVATE
Corporations seek to go private for four principal reasons: (1)
depressed price for the firm's stock, (2) cost savings, (3) freedom from
disclosure and regulatory requirements, and (4) increased managerial
flexibility. However, behind these rationalizations lies a critical vari-
able: the extent of a company's future need for outside capital. If the
business has no further need for external capital (e.g., a service busi-
ness such as advertising), a public vehicle may no longer constitute a
necessity.8
First, insiders usually consider going private because the price of
the company's stock is at an unsatisfactorily low level. Coupled with a
7. As Commissioner A. Sommer, Jr. has noted, "It is difficult to write precise rules
that will clearly distinguish the transactions which should not be considered violative of
the mandate the Commission is under from those which do violate that mandate and
which undermine the confidence of the public in securities markets and corporate in-
tegrity." Sommer, Further Thoughts on "Going Private," BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No.
294, at D-4 (Mar. 19, 1975).
8. See generally Pacey, Going Private, BARRON'S, Mar. 4, 1974, at 3; Letter of
Anthony P. Grassi, Vice-President, Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corporation,
January 10, 1975; Prospectus Pursuant to Exchange Offer of Wells, Rich, Greene, Inc.,
Nov. 4, 1974, at 14 [hereinafter cited as Wells-Rich Prospectus]. Steven James Lee
(Financial Consultant, BT Consultants, Bankers Trust Company), in Going Private,
FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE, December, 1974, at 10, 14, sets forth a ten-fold test of the ad-
vantages of going private:
1) Is the money you spend on glossy annuals and interim reports significant
by company standards? 2) Did principals of your company realize a substantial
amount of cash through sale of their stock when you went public? 3) Do SEC
requirements add heavy extra expense over and above customary financial re-
porting when you were private? 4) Did you go public more than three years
ago? 5) Were all the claims on your original offering prospectus conservative?
6) Is your cash position strong? 7) Is your current stock quotation less than
60% of the issue price? 8) Would you run your company differently and more
advantageously if it were private? 9) Have stock options that you gave key em-
ployees proved to be of little value to them? 10) Is less than 55% of your com-
pany in public hands?
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market price deemed "inappropriate" by management, corporations
with a small amount of outstanding shares ("float") encounter difficulty
in generating institutional investor or broker-dealer interest. The result
is a limited demand and trading market with respect to the stock."
The stock is of little or no value for many of the purposes for which
the corporation went public, including raising further equity or other
capital, use as a vehicle for acquisitions, or management incentives. 10
In particular, diminished security prices lessen the worth of a panoply
of executive compensation devices-stock option, profit sharing and
stock purchase plans. Executive morale, in the eyes of corporate officials,
accordingly suffers as options are found worthless or stock purchased
pursuant to an option plummets in value. Since a secondary offering
of stock stands little chance of success, major shareholders are locked
in holding shares with little liquidity. A laggard stock price may also
have a more far reaching impact on corporate employees who feel that
9. J. F. Nethercutt, Chairman, Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc. noted, "We don't
feel that the financial world has put a proper value on our company, and that holders
of our company's stock have been given unfair treatment." Wall St. J., Jan. 4, 1974, at
12, col. 4.
A company spokesman for Bourns, Inc., indicated that the corporation contem-
plated going private because Marlin E. Bourns, President, "was disappointed with the
performance of the stock recently." Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1974, at 22, col. 3; see, e.g.,
Offer to Purchase, R. B. Jones Corp., Nov. 1, 1974, at 6 (disappointing price level and
extremely limited public market); Offer to Purchase, Ad Press Ltd., Nov. 2, 1973, at
1 (stock market inadequately reflected the value of the firm); Offer to Purchase, Clinton
E. Frank, Inc., Sept. 14, 1973, at 4 (unfavorable stock market reception and limited
demand for stock); Wells-Rich Prospectus at 13-14 (low stock market price in com-
parison with book value, earnings, prospectus, and stock has been lightly traded); Wall
St. J., Sept. 5, 1974, at 8, col. 2 ("Industry executives have long maintained that ad-
vertising agency stocks suffered from the public's misapprehension of their industry as
one marked by extreme volatility. The prices of most agency stocks have been uniformly
depressed for some time."); Exchange Offer, Inland Credit Corp., Oct. 4, 1974, at 4
("depressed price for stock, and thus management was of the opinion.., that the pros-
pects of a substantial increase in the market price in the foreseeable future appear[ed]
limited"); Proxy Statement of Barbara Lynn Stores, Inc., Oct. 8, 1974, at 11 (limited
investor interest, light public trading, disappointing price level, and low price-earnings
multiples for firms in the industry); Proxy Statement (draft) of The North Central Com-
panies, Inc., Nov., 1974, at 9 (depressed market price and low trading volume). Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., in contemplating going private indicated that the price of its shares
did not reflect the corporation's earnings and its potential. Gottschalk, MGM's'74 Tend r
and Exchange Offers for Stock, Debt Are Being Studied by SEC, Wall St. J., Feb. 1,
1975, at 6, col. 3; Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 1974, at 4, col. 2.
10. In addition to management obtaining a sense of achievement and self-fulfillment
and hopefully increasing investment liquidity, other reasons for going public include 1)
securing funds for the corporation; 2) gaining prestige and improving business opera-
tions; 3) expanding through acquisitions involving the exchange of the publicly traded
stock; 4) using stock with a public market or options to purchase such stock to attract
and retain executives; 5) improving corporate net worth, thereby enabling the enterprise
to borrow funds more advantageously as well as the possibility of raising funds through
subsequent public issues. Schneider & Manko, Going Public-Practice, Procedure and
Consequences, 15 VILL. L. Rnv. 283, 283-84 (1970).
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they are working for an enterprise which is not properly managed. An
employee may become disillusioned by observing his retirement bene-
fits, if tied to the company's securities, evaporate as a result of a de-
pressed stock market.". Furthermore, with the demoralization of securi-
ties markets, some corporations find that basic business judgments are
affected by being public. Management spends more and more time
worrying about earnings per share and price-earnings multiples. 12 In
short, corporate executives may recognize and attempt to correct the
original mistake of going public.'3
Second, corporate officials have noted the cost savings inherent in
reverting to a private status.' 4 The additional expenses of being a public
corporation are significant: compliance with federal securities require-
ments5 (particularly the variety of reports that must be prepared and
11. See, e.g., Wells-Rich Prospectus at 14 (Corporation, as a publicly held entity,
had not gained the benefits of employee stock options and business acquisitions because
of uncertain and disappointing stock prices. Stock options failed to provide employee
incentives and stock no longer served as a means of acquiring other firms.). See also
Freeman, Going Private, Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 1974, at 1, col. 6, in which Clinton Frank,
President of Clinton E. Frank, Inc., noted that a low stock price no longer supported the
firm's stock-option program.
12. See, e.g., Wells-Rich Prospectus at 14 (as a private company, management
would be less concerned regarding the immediate impact of costs or earnings and of
earnings on the value of the stock); Offer to Purchase, Diversified Design Disciplines,
Inc., Aug. 1, 1974, at 4 (the firm wished to shift its goals away from earnings per share,
which factor, as a public corporation, impaired the company's ability to stimulate in-
ternal growth by using the full range of compensatory tools.). See also BuSINESS WEEK,
June 30, 1975, at 30.
13. See, e.g., Sam Higgins, President, Air Industries Corp., who stated that his
company was "no longer a corporation suitable for widespread public investment."
Freeman, Going Private, supra note 11.
14. See, e.g., the Proxy Statement of Barbara Lynn Stores, Inc., Oct. 8, 1974, at
11, in which management estimated that expenses for American Stock Exchange and
SEC fees, transfer agent fees, legal fees, and printing totalled approximately $100,000
per year in 1972 and 1973. The North Central Companies, Inc., estimated it could save
$100,000 per year by going private. Freeman, Going Private, supra note 11. See also Lee,
Why Companies Want to Go Private, N. Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1974, § 3, at 14, col. 1.
However a significant and increasing body of regulatory requirements are imposed by
other state and federal agencies. See Armstrong, "Going Private": The Why and The
How, in ACQUIRING PUBLIcLY HELD SECURITIES: GOING PRIVATE AND TENDER OFFERS
172 (R. Kirshberg ed. PLI 1974).
15. Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, if a corporation is large enough
($1,000,000 in assets and at least 500 holders of an equity security) or if the stock is
listed on a securities exchange, the corporation must make periodic disclosure of various
types of information. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1),(m)
(1970). Periodic reports must also be filed if an issuer .has made a registered public
offering under the Securities Act of 1933 and has at least 300 shareholders of record.
Id. § 78o. In such corporations, proxies must be solicited in accordance with the SEC's
proxy rules. Id. § 78n. Restrictions on the buying and selling of the corporation's shares
are imposed on officers, directors, and 10 percent shareholders. Liability may also be
imposed on insiders for inadequate public disclosure, trading on inside information or
tipping such information to others. Id. § 78p.
1975]
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filed with the SEC); the attendant legal, accounting and public rela-
tions fees; and the printing and mailing costs in connection with the
preparation and dissemination of proxy materials and interim and
annual reports. Further, the cost of meeting the regulatory standards
of national securities exchanges, particularly the disclosure rules, as
well as transfer agent and registrar fees must also be taken into account.
Once private, management time and corporate capital need no longer
be diverted to dealing with public shareholders 6 and the SEC.
Third, once a corporation attains public status, information must
be publicly disclosed. Executives may feel uneasy about explaining
their actions and disclosing previously confidential information. Revela-
tions regarding compensation and benefit plans may be distasteful.
Failure to observe the ever expanding scope of fiduciary duties under
state and federal laws may subject corporate insiders to shareholder
suits. Being private frees salaries and new business deals from public
scrutiny.17
Fourth, executives contemplating going private point to increased
managerial flexibility.18 The entrepreneurial minded officer may find
it difficult to differentiate corporate and personal assets. Operating
procedures in a private corporation (for example, placing relatives on
the payroll) would be less restrictive. Private capital may also be easier
to obtain.
Corporate executives are, of course, not oblivious to the fact that
benefits also accrue to insiders. As the remaining shareholders they
may, in effect, be buying assets at below book value and often at a
16. Tender Offer, Treasure Isle, Inc., Mar. 24, 1975, at 11, noted that valuable
management time must be spent "attending to matters derived from its public status
with only questionable benefits to the Company and its stockholders." See, e.g., Offer to
Purchase, Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc., Jan. 18, 1974, at 7; Offer to Purchase, Bourns,
Inc., Oct. 25, 1974, at 7; Offer to Purchase, Presidents-First Lady Spa, Inc., Dec. 20,
1974, at 4-5; Proxy Statement (draft) of The North Central Companies, Inc., Oct. 1974,
at 9-10; Exchange Offer, Inland Credit Corp., Oct. 4, 1974, at 4. See also Armstrong,
"Going Private": The Why and the How, supra note 14, at 172, who notes that although
the cost of compliance with obligations of a public corporation is "probably an over-
rated rationale for a decision to eliminate public shareholders," it "can be a significant
element for some companies," and a substantial cost exists in terms of managerial effort
devoted to dealing with public shareholders.
17. The need to protect trade secrets from disclosure requirements probably con-
stitutes an invalid reason, as the significant adverse consequences which may be en-
visioned rarely occur. Schneider & Manko, Going Public-Practice, Procedure and Con-
sequences, supra note 10, at 284-85.
18. See, e.g., Wells-Rich Prospectus at 14 (Going private would afford greater
flexibility and freedom in payment of cash and other remuneration as employee com-
pensation. Other unspecified benefits would also accrue in relationships with the firm's
employees and clients.). See also Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., Considerations
with Regard to a Public Company "Going Private" (Dec. 17, 1974).
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fraction of the price at which the shares were sold to the public.19 In-
siders may increase or re-establish complete ownership without cash
outlay on their part. The fear of a take-over by a third party is re-
moved, as is the danger of scrutiny of insiders' conduct by courts and
19. See Sommer Address. Selected data on cash tender offers by companies with
an intent to go private indicates the following comparison between the tender offer price
and the book value:
Tender Offer Price as
Issuer Percentage of Book Value
Ad Press, Ltd. 38%
Wally F. Findlay International Galleries, Inc. 76%
Clinton E. Frank, Inc. 25%
Institutional Investor Systems, Inc. 182%
McCaffrey and McCall, Inc. 100%
Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc. 107%
Nardis of Dallas, Inc. 92%
Mr. Wiggs Department Stores, Inc. 66%
Henry I. Siegel & Co., Inc. 49%
Security Plastics, Inc. 133%
Imoco-Gateway Corp. 35%
Quorum Industries 50%
Combined Properties Corp. 84%
Diversified Design Disciplines, Inc. 123%
Federated Development Company 33%
Bourns, Inc. 73%
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., Considerations With Regard to a Public Company
"Going Private"; Exhibit 1 (Certain Data on Recent Cash Tender Offers by Companies
With an Intention to "Go Private") (Oct. 1, 1974).
The insiders, who controlled the corporation when it originally went public, benefit
most by going private. For example, Wells, Rich, Greene, Inc. went public by selling
common stock at $17.50 per share. A secondary offering was priced at $21.75 per share.
Of these public funds, only $696,000 went to the corporation with the remainder going
directly to various controlling persons, including Mary Wells Lawrence, the founder and
head of the agency, who received approximately $3.5 million. The offer by the corpora-
tion in November, 1974, to exchange for each share of common stock held by the public
$3.00 in cash and $8.00 in a subordinated debenture, would, if fully consummated, have
increased the interests of Mary Wells Lawrence from seven to forty-three per cent. See
Scheibla, Private Affair, BARuoN's, March 17, 1975, at 9. For other examples of going
private transactions benefiting insiders, see Pacey, Going Private, supra note 8, at 3.
Insiders in Cornwall Equities, Ltd., for example, could liquidate the private cor-
poration or take it public again at great profit to themselves upon restoration of the firm's
profitability and a better market for new issues. BuSINESS WEEK, Nov. 30, 1974, at 32.
Corporate officials also assert that going private may assist management in coordinat-
ing its personal estate planning with corporate objectives. Paine, Webber, Jackson &
Curtis, Inc., Considerations with Regard to a Public Company "Going Private" 2 (Dec.
17, 1974). However, if the shares of a publicly traded corporation are selling at a de-
pressed price, stemming in large measure from the low price-earnings multiple accorded
such shares, then the insiders may be better off, particularly where the market price is less
than book value. In addition, for valuation for estate and gift tax purposes, the public
market establishes an objective valuation figure.
An additional reason, although not offered, is the high tax bracket of corporate
insiders and their desire that the company pay minimal or no dividends, subject to the
requirements of the accumulated earnings tax. See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§
531-37. Public shareholders may pressure for declaration of dividends and for a regular
dividend policy.
1975]
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the Securities and Exchange Commission. The possibility also exists
for a future reoffering of the shares to the public in a rising market
at an increased price-earnings multiple.
However, in addition to the risk of possible action by the SEC and
litigation on the part of shareholders, several disadvantages exist to
going private. The company will face a cash drain, a need to finance
the transaction through outside sources, or an exchange of corporate
debt obligations.20 In the future, access to the capital market may be
blocked or severely restricted. If the company borrows funds to pur-
chase the shares, its ratio of debt to equity may be significantly in-
creased, thus reducing its debt capacity for expansion or other purposes.
The multiple of earnings afforded by the public market place is elimi-
nated as is the prospect of a heightened multiple in an improved stock
market environment. The elimination of public shares, the "super-
currency," probably renders expansion via the acquistion route more
difficult.21
II. TECHNIQUES AND LEGAL MECHANICS OF GOING PRIVATE
Techniques for going private generally involve transactions by the
issuer and take the form of purchases of stock from public shareholders
for cash (tender offer) or an exchange offer for such shares. A combina-
tion of a tender offer and an exchange offer may be used. These pro-
cedures will reduce the number of shares held by the public and ac-
cordingly raise the percentage of ownership enjoyed by insiders. The
public shareholders have, in theory, the ability to accept or refuse
those corporate offers. 22 For this reason, these techniques are considered
"voluntary" devices. Independent of a tender offer or an exchange offer,
20. In addition to funding considerations, state corporate statutes place limitations
on corporate repurchases of shares. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (Supp. 1970)
(funds may not be used for the repurchase of common shares when a corporation's
capital is impaired or when the purchase would cause a capital impairment). See also
Herwitz, Installment Repurchase of Stock: Surplus Limitations, 79 HARv. L. REv. 303
(1965); Corporate Repurchases, 8 REv. SEC. REG. 991, 992-93 (1975) (legal problems
regarding consolidated surplus of parent and subsidiaries).
21. For a period of two years after the last purchase of shares pursuant to a plan
to go private (or unless the shares so acquired are clearly earmarked and used in a
relatively short time period for specific purposes or until the acquisition of entities in
exchange for all stock so repurchased, whichever is sooner) any business acquisition or
combination in which the corporation will be the acquired or acquiring party will be
treated, for accounting purposes, as a purchase. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 146,
5 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP., at 72,168 (Aug. 24, 1973); SEC Accounting Series Release
No. 146-A, 5 OCH FED. SEc. L. REP., at ff 72,168-A (Apr. 11, 1974).
22. See also text at 170-72.
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or in conjunction therewith, a corporation may undertake a variety of
"involuntary" (or cramdown) transactions, including short-form2 a or
long-form merger,24 reverse stock split2 5 or a sale of assets followed by
the liquidation of the enterprise.
A voluntary cash repurchase by a corporation may take one of two
forms: market purchases20 or a tender offer.2 7 Corporations with the
available funds have preferred 'to use the cash tender offer path in
going private28 because of a desire to consummate the transaction in
a single step. The implementation of this technique requires considera-
tion of federal regulation of tender offers,2 particularly disclosure re-
23. Under a short-form merger statute, a parent corporation, owing a specified
percentage of the outstanding shares of another corporation, may merge such other
corporation into itself without the approval of the shareholders of either corporation.
H. HENN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 346, at 715 (2d ed. 1970).
24. Under a long-form merger statute, the consolidation of a merger between two
corporations requires the approval of the holders of a specified percentage, as prescribed
by statute, of the outstanding shares of each corporation. Id. at 714-15.
25. A reverse stock split, or a split down, occurs when a number of shares are
combined to form a smaller number of shares. There is no transfer from surplus to stated
capital in a reverse stock split, however, there may be a change in the value per share.
H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 330, at 673 (2d ed. 1970).
26. It is possible for corporate insiders to undertake, themselves, purchases at
market or through a tender offer. However, in addition to the disclosure problems and
regulation under the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1970),
amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78n (1964), such individuals face a practical requirement
-- cash. A tender offer by principal shareholders as a means of going private has been at-
tempted by a handful of corporations, including Air Industries Corporation and Nardis
of Dallas, Inc. See Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., Considerations With Regard
to a Public Company "Going Private," Exhibit 1 (Certain Data on Recent Cash Tender
Offers by Companies with an Intention to "Go Private") (Oct. 1, 1974). It is also
possible for an employee pension plan or an employee stock ownership plan, in whole,
or in part, to undertake the purchases. See, e.g., Offer to Purchase, R. B. Jones Corp.,
Nov. 1, 1974. See also note 29 infra & accompanying text & note infra.
27. See Rule 10b-13 which, subject to certain exceptions, prohibits an issuer or
other person who has made a tender or exchange offer from purchasing or arranging
to purchase any equity security which is the subject of such offer otherwise than pur-
suant to the offer. SEC Rule lOb-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1975).
28. See, e.g., Offer to Purchase, Treasure Isle, Inc., March 24, 1975; Offer to
Purchase, Bourns, Inc., Oct. 25, 1974; Offer to Purchase, Ad Press, Ltd., Nov. 2, 1973;
Offer to Purchase, Presidents-First Lady Spa, Inc., Dec. 20, 1974; Offer to Purchase,
Diversified Design Disciplines, Inc., Aug. 1, 1974; Offer to Purchase, Clinton E. Frank,
Inc., Sept. 14, 1973; Wall St. J., Apr. 11, 1975, at 2, col. 2. See generally Paine, Webber,
Jackson & Curtis, Inc., Considerations with a Regard to a Public Company "Going
Private," Exhibit 1 (Certain Data on Recent Cash Tender Offers by Companies with
an Intention to "Go Private") (Oct. 1, 1974).
29. The Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1970), amending
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78n (1964), requires extensive disclosures by both tender offerors
(Section 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)) and by persons purchasing a requisite percentage
of the registered equity securities of an issuer (Section 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)),
and regulates the terms by which tender offers may be made (Section 14(e), 15 U.S.C.
§' 78n(e) ). A tender offer is also subject to substantive regulation (Section 14(d) (5) and
(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (5), (d)(6)). Under Section 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d),
1975]
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quirements under section 14 (e) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1984,30 and rule lOb-5,31 as well as the limitations of rule lOb-632 and
a person who, after consummation of an offer, would be the beneficial owner, directly
or indirectly, of more than five per cent of such class, may make an offer, request or
invitation for tenders for any class of any equity security registered under Section 12
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78k, only if such person has filed
with the SEC, at the time of first making such offer, request or invitation a statement
containing the information required by rule 14d-1 (as specified in Schedule 13 D).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970). Under Section 14(e) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e), it is unlawful for any person to make any
untrue statement of a material fact, or omit any material fact, or engage in any fraud-
ulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice in connection with any tender offer or
any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request
or invitation for tenders. Section 14(e) requires that the alleged fraudulent conduct have
occurred "in connection with" a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders. Section
14(e) contains, however, no purchaser-seller requirement. Electronic Specialty Co. v.
International Controls Co., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969). Of course, material information
must be disclosed. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
153-54 (1972) (materiality defined as facts withheld "that a reasonable investor might
have considered . . . important in the making of this decision"). But see Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 362 (2d Cir. 1973) (facts a reason-
able man would consider important to his decision to tender or not to tender) ; Gerstle v.
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Broder v. Dane, [1974-
1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 94,875 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1974)("standard of materiality tending more toward a reasonable possibility than toward
probability, thus requiring something more than mere possibility, but something less than
probability"); Kaufman v. Lawrence, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. J 94,908 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1974), aff'd per curiam, Civil No. 74-2591 (2d Cir.
Apr. 3, 1975).
A greater burden of disclosure, is imposed on tender offers made by the corporation
or its insiders, than would reasonably be expected of a third party. Broder v. Dane, supra(failure to disclose prior repurchase from large shareholder at a higher price held in-
adequate).
Specific disclosure problem areas include asset values (e.g., Gerstle v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973)); intangible values (e.g., Feit v. Leasco
Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)); significant forecasts(e.g. Beecher v. Able, 374 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)); SEC Securities Act Release
No. 5362, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 79,211 (Feb. 2, 1973);
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969); vague disclosure of plans (e.g., Texas Gulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp.,
366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973)); related transaction (Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v.
Wellington Associates, 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973)). For a discussion of the use of ap-
praisals, see Comment, The Use of Appraisals in SEC Documents, 122 U. PA. L. REv.
138 (1973). For a list of specific disclosure items, see Beck, Corporate Stock Repur-
chases and Going Private-Disclosure Requirements, in PLI, SLxTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE
ON SECUsuTlWs REGULATION 374, 376-79 (A. Fleischer & L. Mundheim eds. 1974)(especially the effect of going private on the market for the securities and reporting re-
quirements, the need to disclose further plans and proposals, how the total plan will be
carried out, participation by insiders in the transaction, financing details, related trans-
actions and plans). Disclosure in a tender offer should, among other things, point out
that a public market for the corporation's stock may not exist, if a corporation purchases
a sufficiently large percentage of the stock. Wells-Rich Prospectus at 16, indicating that
White, Weld & Co. intended to make an over-the-counter market for untendered shares,
if the corporation were delisted, stated:
The trading activity in such a market would depend upon a number of shares
remaining in public hands and the number of holders. If substantially all of the
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proposed rule 13e-2. 33 As an alternative to a cash transaction, an issuer
publicly held shares are exchanged, stockholders might encounter difficulty
in obtaining prices they deem reasonable for their shares.
The tender offer should also disclose the possibility of deregistration and delisting, elimi-
nation of the remaining shareholders should a short-form or cash merger occur, and the
possibility of a sale of significant assets. The value of the issuer, the method of arriving
at such conclusion, and the relationship of the cash tender price to such value is of
particular significance. See generally E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR
CORPOrATE CO.NTROL (1973).
31. Since the tender offer involves the purchase or sale of a security, rule 1Ob-5 is
applicable.
32. Rule lOb-6 provides, subject to specified exemptions, that for an issuer, "to bid
for or purchase . . . any security which is the subject of distribution" shall constitute a
"manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance." Thus, an issuer cannot purchase,
directly or indirectly, any security which is the subject of such distribution, securities of
the same class or series, or rights to acquire the securities being distributed. For example,
if an issuer has outstanding publicly held warrants or securities convertible into the class
to be purchased, such warrants or convertibles constitute a continuing offering and a
"distribution" of such security for the purposes of rule 10b-6. See Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970); Weiss & Leibowitz, Rule 10b-6
Revisited, 39 GEo. WAsr. L. REV. 474, 479-81 (1971); SEC Securities Act Release No.
8712, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 77,745 (Oct. 8, 1969).
Exemption from rule lOb-6 in certain circumstances for purchases has been proposed for
repurchases made in accordance with proposed rule 13e-2. SEC Securities Act Release
No. 10,539, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 79,600 (Dec. 6, 1973)
(Proposed Rule 10b-6(f) and (g)); Lewis, Federal Securities Regulation of Issuer
Repurchases, in AcQUIRING PUBLICLY HELD SECURITIES: GOING PRIVATE AND TENDER
OFFERS 147-50 (R. Kirshberg ed. PLI 1974). See generally 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1595-1604 (2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1969); 6 id. at 3765-77; E. WEISS, REGIS-
TRATION AND REGULATION OF BROKERS AND DEALERS 112-13, 124-38 (1965); Wolfson,
Rule 10b-6: The Illusory Search for Certainty, 25 STAN. L. REV. 809 (1973).
33. Proposed rule 13e-2, SEC Securities Act Release No. 10,539, [1973 Trans-
fer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 79,600 (Dec. 6, 1973), proferred under section
13(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e), grants the SEC
the authority to define acts and practices in connection with corporate repurchases which
are fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative and to prescribe means reasonably designed
to prevent such acts. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 8930, [1969-1970 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 77,837 (July 13, 1970); SEC Securities Act Re-
lease No. 10,539 supra. Proposed rule 13e-2 is patterned after SEC v. Georgia-Pacific
Corp., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 91,680 (complaint) and
91,692 (May 24, 1966) (consent judgment) and Genesco, Inc. Prospectus (May 10,
1966), [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 77,354. Although not
a per se exemptive rule, it purports to define certain acts as illegal without mandating
that under all factual circumstances repurchases under the rule will be legal. The pro-
posed rule provides that any repurchase of equity securities by a corporation whose
securities are registered pursuant to section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 781, if not in compliance with the proposed rule, is a fradulent, decep-
tive or manipulative act or practice. The rule is designed to prevent the use of certain
trading techniques to gain maximum stock market impact. Interbroker competition
might bid up the price as could purchases at the opening or closing of the trading day.
Therefore, the issuer may only use one broker on any day and cannot purchase at the
opening of trading or within one half hour prior to the close of the trading day. By
establishing a volume limitation on repurchases, the rule seeks to prevent a corpora-
tion from dominating the market in its stock. Finally, by prohibiting an issuer from pur-
chasing above established price levels, the rule prevents an issuer's purchases from
creating an ever mounting price spiral. As well as open market purchases, th6 rule,
subject to a variety of exemptions, will also control block purchases, privately negotiated
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may structure an exchange offer using its own debt instruments or re-
deemable securities.84 The issuer may also include a specific per share
amount of cash in the exchange offer. 85
To conclude a going private transaction, the tender offer or ex-
change offer, which has reduced the number of shares in public hands,
may be followed by (1) delisting and deregistration of the issuer's
(non-stock exchange) transactions not involving a broker or dealer, purchases by em-
ployee plans of the issuer, purchases by broker-dealer issuers, and purchases by control
persons. The proposed rule does not require substantive disclosure, presumably because
of the limited price impact. The Commission has also requested comment on the appli-
cability of the disclosure concept to issuer repurchase programs and the content and
manner of such disclosure, if suitable. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 10,539, [1973-
1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 79,600 (Dec. 6, 1973). The proposed
rule 13e-2 has been used as a guideline by experienced securities practitioners. See Kerr,
Corporate Stock Repurchases-Substantive Trading Restrictions, in SIXTH ANNUAL IN-
STITUTE ON SECURTI ES REGULATION 11, 18 (PLI Handbook 1974). See also id. at
13-15 for a list of problems, questions, and comments relating to proposed rule 13e-2;
Goodman, Listed Securities Repurchases by Issuers: Federal Regulation, in ACQUIRINO
PUBLICLY HELD SECURITIES: GOING PRIVATE AND TENDER OFFERS 136 (R. Kirshberg
ed. PLI 1974).
An issuer solicited private transaction, not involving a broker or a dealer and not
effected on a stock exchange, is free from the volume limitations but not the price re-
quirement of proposed rule 13e-2. If an issuer does not solicit a transaction which is not
effected on a stock exchange, it is free from the restrictions imposed by proposed rule
13e-2 and may repurchase shares at a mutually agreed price and in any amount. Malley,
Corporate Repurchases of Stock: Proposed Rule 13e-2 Revisited, 29 Bus. LAw 879 (April,
1974). An issuer has an affirmative duty of full disclosure prior to initiating repurchases
so as to comply with rule 10b-5. Kerr, supra, at 17-18, 25. But see Fleischer, Mundheim, &
Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Impact Informa-
tion, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 840-47 (1973). See also Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial
Dynamics Fund, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] OCH Fw. SEo. L. REP. 1 94,907
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 1974) (rule 10b-5 limited to inside corporate information). However,
if the purchaser is the corporation or the insiders, does the market information become
inside corporate information? For an indication that the SEC staff has accepted the
concept of market information, see SEC v. Sorg Printing Co., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 94,767, at 95,034. (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 1974). The SEC
and exchange or supervisory market authorities must also be notified. Johnston, Repur-
chases of Securities, 6 REV. SEC. REG. 926, 927 (1973). See generally Harrison, Corpo-
rate Stock Repurchase Programs: SEC and Other Problems, in PLI, SECOND ANNUAL IN-
STITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 211 (A. Fleischer, Jr. & R. Mundheim eds. 1971).
34. See, e.g., Gottschalk, MGM's '74 Tender and Exchange Offers For Stock Debt
Are Being Studied By SEC, Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1975, at 6, col. 3; Pacey, Going Private,
supra note 8, at 3 (American Financial Leasing & Services Co.); Scheibla, Private Affair,
supra note 19, at 23; BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 2, 1974, at 30 (proposal of Rapid-American
Corp.); BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 2, 1974, at 90; Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 1974, at 4, col. 3
(Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., proposed an exchange of all the corporation's currently
outstanding common shares for a new issue of callable participating voting Class B
Common); Wall St. J., Nov. 26, 1974, at 2, col. 2; Wall St. J., Dec. 24, 1974, at 4,
col. 4; Exchange Offer, Inland Credit Corp., Oct. 4, 1974 (subordinated debentures).
If interest rates decline the debentures can be refunded. If the price of an issuer's stock
increases, the corporation might attempt a public offering using the acquired shares
and apply all or a portion of the proceeds to the retirement of the debentures. If interest
rates rise, the debentures could be re-acquired at a discount. See also Abelson, Up and
Down Wall Street, BARRON'S, Sept. 16, 1974, at 21.
35. See Wells-Rich Prospectus (cash and subordinated debentures).
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stock38 and/or (2) a short-form or long-form merger of the issuer and
a new private corporation.37 A request for delisting by a national securi-
ties exchange or supervisory market authority reduces invester interest
in the stock which is thereby rendered more illiquid, placing more
pressure on the remaining public shareholders to sell out. Deregistra-
tion with the SEC reduces corporate reporting obligations thereby de-
creasing the availability of publicly disclosed information. The response
of the Securities and Exchange Commission to a request for deregistra-
tion, as part of a plan for going private, remains uncertain.3 8
As part of a tender offer or an exchange offer, or independently
thereof, a corporation may use a variety of involuntary techniques,
including short-form merger, long-form merger, reverse stock split,
36. For the delisting requirements, see N.Y.S.E. Rules 499 & 500, 2 CCH N.Y.S.E.
GumE 1 2499, 2500.
As a condition to listing new Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. (MGM) shares to be
issued pursuant to a stock split, MGM informed the New York Stock Exchange it would
not make any tender or exchange offers for any of its capital stock in the foreseeable
future. The New York Stock Exchange also required a supplemental listing agreement,
which, among other things, provides that as long as MGM's common stock is listed,
MGM, its officers or directors will not take any action with respect to capital stock if
such reduction will result in fewer than 4,000 holders of 100 or more of MGM's com-
mon shares, or if it would result in fewer than two million publicly held shares of MGM
common, or if the aggregate market value of the publicly held shares of MGM common
stock would drop below 22 million dollars. Gottschalk, supra note 34, at 6, col. 4.
After delisting from a securities exchange, the issuer, if required to be registered
under Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (g), is
automatically registered under Section 12(g) if, on termination of the listing, securities
of the class are held of record by 300 or more persons. Rule 12g-2, 2 CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP. 1 23,305. The issuer would request deregistration under Section 12(g) (4). As a
Section 12(g) reporting company, the issuer may deregister in 90 days, or such shorter
period as the SEC may determine, after certifying to the SEC that the number of record
holders is less than 300. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (4). Under Section 15(d) of the Securities
Act of 1934, an issuer who has filed a registration stat6ment under the Securities Act of
1933 must continue to file periodic reports for the balance of its fiscal year in which it
deregisters if, at the beginning of such period, there were more than 300 record holders
of the registered security.
Although an issuer deregisters under Section 12 (g), the corporation may remain sub-
ject to the periodic reporting and proxy solicitation requirements if it continues to have
debt outstanding under a registered trust indenture. See Corporate Repurchases, 8 REv.
SEc. REG. 991, 995 (Jan. 13, 1975).
37. These merger techniques also may be used as the sole means of going private.
38. The staff of the SEC has disapproved at least two transactions where issuers
sought to reacquire shares in order to terminate registration under Section 1 2(g) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. However, one of these decisions was later reversed.
House of Adler, Inc., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 78,515
(Sept. 30, 1971) (transaction disapproved on ground that depriving remaining sharehold-
ers of the protections accorded a reporting company under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 raised questions under the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws);
First of Michigan Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 79,401 (Mar.
29, 1973), revd, 79,502 (Jul. 25, 1973). Among other factors, presumably, the Com-
mission is using its power to condition exemptions under rule lOb-6(f) to prevent or
discourage disfavored transactions. Kerr, supra note 33, at 16.
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sale of assets and liquidation. In either a short-form or long-form
merger under state law, the insider group first forms a new corpora-
tion and transfers its interest in the public corporation to the new
corporation in exchange for all of the shares of such new corporation.
Under a short-form merger statute, the new private corporation, the
parent, having the specified percentage of share ownership in the sub-
sidiary (in this case, the public corporation) requires the shareholders
of the public company, without the approval of such holders, to ex-
change their stock for cash, or debt securities or redeemable stock of
the private entity. Thereupon, such public shareholders cease to have
an equity interest in the surviving private corporation which is wholly
owned by the insiders."
In the event the insiders cannot employ the short-form merger
statute, because the newly formed private corporation lacks the requi-
site percentage ownership, or state law does not provide for such a
transaction, a long-form merger statute may be utilized, and share-
holders may be given cash as consideration for their shares.40 Although
requiring the approval of the shareholders of the public corporation, 41
39. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw
§§ 905, 907(c) (McKinney 1965); Note, The Short Merger Statute, 32 U. CHI. L. REv.
596 (1965). For an example of litigation involving a short-form merger see Levine v.
Biddle Sawyer Corp., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,816
(I1. Oct. 7, 1974).
40. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1970); N.Y. Bus CORP. LAW § 903
(McKinney 1965). For use of cash, property rights or securities, see DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 252(b) (1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 902(a)(3) (McKinney 1965). For
"cash out" mergers using a private corporation, see, e.g., Cardwell, Cerro's Leadership
Housing Is in Danger of Going Under, Filings With SEC Say, Wall St. J., Apr. 9, 1975,
at 8, col. 2; Metz, Stockholder Opposes Going-Private Plan, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1975,
at 34, col. 3; BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 7, 1974, at 37; FORBES, Apr. 1, 1975, at 50; Wall St.
J., May 5, 1975, at 11, col. 2; Wall St. J., Apr. 29, 1975, at 10, col. 1; Wall St. J., Mar.
4, 1975, at 17, col. 1; Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1974, at 5, col. 1; Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 1974, at
4, col. 2 (public corporation owning 85 percent of another public corporation proposed
merger using subordinated debentures of surviving public corporation). For an example
of a litigated cash freeze-out merger involving minority shareholders in a private corpo-
ration, see Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974) & text at 159-62.
For examples involving minority shareholders in a public corporation, see Grimes v.
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP. 1 94,722 (N.D. Fla. Jul. 15, 1974). See also University Capital Corp. v. Barbara
Lynn Stores, Inc., Civ. No. 74-4460 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 1974) (The owners of 43
percent of the stock of Barbara Lynn Stores, Inc., a public corporation, transferred
their stock to a newly created private corporation. A merger was sought between Barbara
Lynn Stores, Inc., and the corporation, pursuant to which the public shareholders would
receive cash and the owners of the 43 percent interest would own the new private corpo-
ration. Proxy Statement of Barbara Lynn Stores, Inc., Oct. 8, 1974) ; Albright v. Bergen-
dahl, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,997 (D. Utah Sept. 5,
1974); Wall St. J., Aug. 1, 1974, at 14, col. 6; Wall St. J., May 29, 1974, at 29, col.
3; Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 1974, at 4, col. 2.
4i. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (Supp. 1970) (majority of outstanding
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a long-form merger constitutes an involuntary transaction because of
the dominant interest of the private corporation in the public entity.
In addition to state law considerations, planning a merger transaction
involves consideration of federal securities laws including regulation
1442 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 145.48
Other involuntary modes of forcing out public shareholders in-
clude: (1) a reverse stock split and (2) a sale of assets and liquidation.
A reverse stock split, with an extremely high exchange ratio (e.g., one
new share for each 500 owned) mandates that holders of fractional
shares, after the split, exchange their new fractional shares for cash. A
shareholder lacking a sufficient number of old shares to exchange for at
least one new one will be barred from the public market.44 A corpora-
tion may also go private by selling the assets, for cash, to the insiders
(or a new corporation controlled by such shareholders), followed by a
liquidation of the issuer so as to eliminate the public shareholders. 45
shares); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 903 (McKinney 1965) (two-thirds of all outstanding
shares).
42. Deregistration, pursuant to Section 12(g) (4) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 removes compliance with proxy statement requirements under Regulation 14-A and
information statement requirements under Regulation 14-C. See Beek, Corporate Stock
Repurchases and Going Private-Disclosure Requirements, in PLI, SIXTH ANNUAL INSTI-
TUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 380-81, 383 (A. Fleischer Jr. & L. Mundheim eds.
1974)- (particularly whether short-form merger technique requires an Information
statement). But see Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44 (D.NJ. 1974).
43. As a cash transaction does not involve the issuance of a security, registration
will not be required under rule 145; however, the technique may be vulnerable under
a "step" transaction doctrine. See Beek, supra note 42, at 381-82. Registration underrule
145 is required if the shareholders will receive debt or if redeemable securities will be
required. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5316, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fan.
SEC. L. RaP. [ 79,075 (Oct. 6, 1972). If shareholder action is required in a cash
or redeemable preferred stock merger, a proxy or information statement may be re-
quired. Possible exemptions from rule 145 include sections 3(a) (9) and (10) of the
Securities Act of 1933. Since the issuer is publicly held, rules 146 and 147 will probably
not be helpful in establishing an exemption.
44. A reverse split will be accomplished through an amendment to the corporation's
articles of incorporation, which usually requires the approval of at least a majority of
the shareholders of a corporation. See, e.g., Sommer Address; Bender, The Battle Over
"Going Private", N.Y. Times, July 13, 1975, § 3, at 1, col. 3; Freeman, supra note 11,
at 1, col. 6; Scheibla, supra note 19, at 9, 23 (proposal abandoned) ; Wall St. J., Sept. 9,
1974, at 16, col. 4. But see Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 59 Ill. 2d 452, 322
N.E.2d 54 (1974) (reverse stock split held constitutional under Illinois law).
45. A sale of assets and liquidation will ordinarily require the approval of a ma-
jority, and often two-thirds, of the shareholders of a corporation. For example, Rowlands,
Inc., planned to sell a portion of its assets for cash to a new corporation owned primarily
by insiders and liquidate. Wall St. J., Mar. 11, 1975, at 29, col. 1. It may be argued
that the sale of assets to insiders constitutes an inequitable abuse of the statutory sale of
assets procedure.
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III. JUDICIAL RESOLUTION OF THE GOING PRIVATE PROBLEM
A shareholder who believes that a going private transaction is
"improper," apart from violations pertaining to the legal mechanics,
particularly disclosure, may seek relief under state law fiduciary con-
cepts and rule lOb-5. However, there is a lack of clarity regarding the
evolving state law fiduciary duties, as well as an unwillingness of many
federal courts to hold that unfairness, in and of itself, states a claim for
relief under rule lOb-5. By failing to provide guidelines to assess the
traditional state law fiduciary duties to minority shareholders (a valid
business purpose and price fairness), courts have placed businessmen
and their counsel in a position of uncertainty in planning going private
transactions.
A. Fiduciary Duties Under State Law
Under common law, a merger required the unanimous consent of
all affected shareholders.40 In response to the growing magnitude of
corporations, the increase in the number of shareholders in such enti-
ties, and the possible nuisance value created by a recalcitrant minority,
most state legislatures empowered a majority of two-thirds of each class
46. Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 (1941); Geddes v.
Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921); S.E.C. REPORT OF THE STUDY
AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PRO-
TECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION CosmrITTEE pt. VII, at 557, 590 (1938); Gibson, How
Fixed Are Class Shareholder Rights?, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PRon. 283 (1958). However,
the doctrine was rejected by a minority of courts which permitted, under common law,
sale of assets by less than the unanimous consent of all the shareholders. See, e.g., Beiden-
kopf v. Des Moines Life Ins. Co., 160 Iowa 629, 142 N.W. 434 (1913); Paterson v.
Shattuck Arizona Copper Co., 186 Minn. 611, 244 N.W. 281 (1932).
For a theory that it is unconstitutional to allow termination of the shareholder's in-
terest for cash, see Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15
CORNELL L.Q. 420, 427 (1930). But see Coyne v. Park & TilfordDistillers Corp., 38Del.
Ch. 514, 154 A.2d 893 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Wilcox v. Stern, 18 N.Y.2d 195, 219 N.E.2d
401, 273 N.Y.S.2d 38 (1966); Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. I1, 87
N.E.2d 561, (1949), which all uphold the constitutionality of the short-form merger
statutes. See also Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,722 (N.D. Fla. Jul. 15, 1974). A stockholder has
no absolute right to his interest in the corporation and may be forced to surrender his
shares for a fair cash price. Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 59 Ill. 2d 452, 322
N.E.2d 54, (1974), rehearing denied (Jan. 28, 1975). But see Brudney & Chirelstein,
Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARv. L. REV. 297, 323-24 n.56
(1974); Note, Elimination of Minority Share Interest by Merger: A Dissent, 54 Nw.
U. L. REV. 629 (1959). See also Goldberg v. Arrow Electronics, Inc., BNA SEa. REo. &
L. REP. No. 311, at A-17 (July 16, 1975) (Docket No. 74-1530, petition for cert. filed
June 5, 1975).
Underlying the controversy is the change from a vested theory of shareholder rights
to a contract or social duty concept. See Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers
Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REV. 1145, 1156-61 (1932); Gibson, How Fixed Are Class
Shareholder Rights?, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 283 (1958).
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of shareholders to approve a merger. This, in turn, opened the pos-
sibility for the victimization of the minority shareholders. To resolve
the problem, most states adopted appraisal statutes permitting a share-
holder the opportunity to dissent from certain specified corporate
changes and, after an appraisal proceeding, to receive cash from the
corporation in consideration for his shares.47 In certain jurisdictions,
the appraisal method, by statute, constitutes the exclusive remedy for
a minority shareholder.4 However, in the absence of express statutory
language, courts have divided on the exclusiveness of the appraisal
remedy.49 In a jurisdiction where an appraisal is viewed as nonexclu-
47. Most states provide appraisal for a merger transaction, while a lesser number
make appraisal available for the sale of all or substantially all of a corporation's assets.
See, e.g., DEL, CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623 (McKin-
ney 1965); W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1708 (4th ed. unabr.
1969) ; Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE
L.J. 223, 262 (1962). See also Sterlingv. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d
107 (Sup. Ct. 1952), aff'g. 33 Del. Ch. 20, 89 A.2d 862 (Del. Ch. 1952); Robb
v. Eastgate Hotel, Inc., 347 Ill. App. 261, 106 N.E.2d 848 (1952); Kavanaugh v.
Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919). In Bryan v. Brock &
Blevins Co., Inc., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974), the court, although not dealing with
the question of exclusiveness of the appraisal remedy, by implication concluded in favor
of non-exclusiveness. Id. at 568-69 n.3.
In Delaware, absent fraud or overreaching, the appraisal remedy is exclusive. See
David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Oh. 1971). See also
Marshel v. AFW Fabrics, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 95,219,
at 98,134 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1975) stating that under New York law appraisal is the
exclusive remedy, citing Willcox v. Stern, 18 N.Y.2d 195, 201-02, 219 N.E.2d 401, 404,
273 N.Y.S.2d 38, 43 (1966) & Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d
501 (1949). In reality, courts, even if espousing the concept that the appraisal remedy
constitutes the exclusive relief, have devised various means of avoiding the doctrine of ex-
clusiveness. Note, Interplay of Rights of Stockholders Dissenting From Sale of Corporate
Assets, 58 COLUm. L. REv. 251, 254 (1958). The existence of a state appraisal remedy
does not negate a federal claim under rule lOb-5. See Levine v. Biddle Sawyer Corp.,
383 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). For an outline of the disclosures required under
rule 145 to shareholders who elect state appraisal rights, see Beek, supra note 42.
48. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 4123 (West 1955). But see MIcH. Comp. LAws
ANN. § 450.1771 (West 1973), which provides that the appraisal remedy shall be non-
exclusive.
This shift in legislative attitude, may stem in part from a repugnance against forcing
a shareholder to surrender his equity interest unless the structural change serves a valid
business purpose apart from the desire by the majority to enlarge its holding or eliminate
the minority. Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right,
77 HARv. L. REv. 1189, 1200-05 (1964).
49. Compare Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel, Inc., 202 Misc. 988, 115 N.Y.S.2d
52 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (in dismissing, for legal insufficiency, a complaint alleging that the
purpose is to eliminate or "freeze out" scattered minority shareholders, the court ob-
served that merely to seek to eliminate minority shareholders does not raise an issue
of illegality.) with Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025, 1033 (1952).
In a short-form merger, appraisal is apparently the exclusive remedy. See, e.g.,
Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1962);
Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d 561 (1949).
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sive, a dissident shareholder may, among other remedies, seek to en-
join a merger alleging a breach of fiduciary duties.
A shareholder probably has little to gain by invoking an appraisal
statute where he holds shares traded on a securities exchange or in the
over-the-counter market. After encountering a delay in payment, re-
ceiving no dividends during the proceeding, facing strict procedural
requirements and substantial litigation costs, in the end, "he will be
awarded the market price of the shares." 50 If the consideration offered
as part of a freeze-out merger exceeds the market price, a dissenting
shareholder is better off accepting the deal. In short, as appraisal does
not serve as an effective remedy for the breach of fiduciary standards,
some courts have imposed fiduciary obligations on majority share-
holders.
The nature of the fiduciary duty51 owed by majority shareholders
to minority shareholders, particularly with reference to the question
of burden of proof, remains unclear. Traditionally, courts imposed
upon controlling shareholders only a fiduciary obligation to the corpo-
ration or those acting on behalf of the corporation.5 2 The theory that
a controlling shareholder occupies a position of trust received recogni-
tion by the United States Supreme Court in 1939.53 The Court stated:
"[A controlling shareholder] cannot use his power for his personal
advantage and to the detriment of the stockholders and creditors no
matter how absolute in terms that power may be and no matter how
meticulous he is to satisfy technical requirements."" Even courts im-
50. Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker,
72 YALE L.J. 223, 233 (1962). But Cf. C. ISRAELS, CORPORATE PRACTICE § 14.06 (3d
ed. 1974); Note, Valuatioir of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARv. L.
REV. 1453 (1966). Some legislatures have made market price the sole test by permitting
the elimination of appraisal if the stock trades in a public market. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 262k (Supp. 1970). For a recent example of a court using market value as an
indicator of value, see Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. 94,988, at 97,430 (D.N.J. 1974). For an analysis of the procedural diffi-
culties encountered in the exercise of appraisal rights, see Kaplan, Problems in the Ac-
quisition of Shares of Dissenting Minorities, 34 B.U.L. REv. 291 (1954).
51. Merely identifying a fiduciary duty does not describe it. SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
318 U.S. 80, 85-6 (1943) ("[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it
gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he
owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge these obligations?").
52. See 3 L. Loss, SECURiTIES REGULATION 1446 (1961).
53. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939).
54. Id. at 311; Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81
Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969). In Jones, controlling shareholders, owning 87 percent of a sav-
ings and loan association, swapped their shares for stock of a holding company which
then went public creating liquidity for the majority's holdings, but not for the minority
shareholders. The court held that the controlling shareholders are governed by a compre-
hensive rule of inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those in-
terested therein, including the minority shareholders.
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posing a fiduciary duty on the majority toward minority shareholders,
however, may require proof of bad faith or some type of fraud, thus
eroding the "fairness" standard used in assessing such an obligation. 55
The burden of proving noncompliance with the required standard
is usually imposed on the minority shareholders.56 Several courts, how-
ever, have required the majority shareholders to prove that they acted
in good faith towards the minority and that the transaction was in-
herently fair.57
Recognizing that a majority shareholder owes a fiduciary duty to
minority interests, two federal courts applying state law, in recent deci-
sions involving freeze-out mergers, have attempted to develop more
55. See, e.g., Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of America, 14
Del. Ch. 1, 120 A. 486 (Del. Ch. 1923); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226
N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919). A retrencment from the fairness doctrine as a standard
in interested merger transactions may be occurring in Delaware. In Sterling v. May-
flower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (1952), in establishing a fairness test,
the court found the standard of business judgment or fraud inapplicable. Folk sums up
recent Delaware law and the progeny of the Sterling rule as follows:
Thus, the effective vitality of the Sterling rule in "interested merger" transac-
tions is in grave jeopardy. Perhaps, however, it is possible to synthesize the most
recent. decisions along the following lines. The "fairness" rule does not apply
if the contest only concerns valuation, no matter how deeply the transaction
is colored by conflict of interests. On the other hand, the fairness rule is ap-
plicable if an issue other than valuation is in dispute, such as seizure of a corpo-
rate opportunity, a drastic reduction in the earnings or book value of the stock
of the acquired corporation, or something else which strongly offends the court.
But even this may give too much life to the fairness rule, if the plaintiff must
make an initial showing that the interested transaction constitutes actionable
self-dealing. In any event, the attempted reconcilation is only a guess as to the
final state of a very fluid subject. More significantly, it is a synthesis only at
a verbal level, for it comes perilously close to concluding that for "interested
merger" transactions the standard is no longer the proof of "full fairness" under
"careful scrutiny by the courts," but simply a covert adoption of the "fraud"
test, applicable heretofore only to "third party mergers."
E. FOLK, DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 336 (1972) (footnote omitted); see
David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 35 (Del. Oh. 1971); Sin-
clair Oil v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971); Chasin v. Gluck, 282 A.2d 188, 192 (Del.
Ch. 1972).
56. Note, Freezing Out Minority Shareholders, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1630, 1638
(1961). The burden of proof is significant. In establishing bad faith, a minority share-
holder may have to prove that the majority's prime, if not sole purpose, was to eliminate
the minority or benefit at the expense of the minority. The burden of negating the legiti-
macy of business purpose is especially difficult. But in Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.,
33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107, 110 (1952), the defendant conceded that a majority
shareholder in a parent-subsidiary merger must "bear the burden of establishing its en-
tire fairness." See also David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l., Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 432
(Del. Ch. 1968); Albright v. Bergendahl, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FFD. SEc. L.
REP. J 94,997 (D. Utah, 1974), petition to 10th Cir. for writ of mandamus denied, Feb.
6, 1975, where court held that under rule 10b-5, the plaintiff did not have a duty to
negate the legitimacy of corporate purpose.
57. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); cf. Vorenberg, Dissenter's
Appraisal Rights, 77 HtAv. L. REv. 1189, 1212-13 (1964).
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specific guidelines. In so doing, attention has been focused on two
factors: (1) did the transaction have a redeeming business purpose and,
(2) was the price fair. In Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co.58 the controlling
shareholders of a private corporation, after unsuccessfully attempting
to buy out a minority shareholder, transferred their shares to a newly
created corporation, which was organized for the purpose of eliminat-
ing the minority shareholder. The majority merged the existing cor-
poration with the new entity, giving the minority shareholder cash
for his interest. The court found the merger to be a paper transaction
without any business purpose other than to eliminate the minority
shareholder.59 Emphasizing the need for fairness in corporate trans-
actions, the court quoted with approval the following language in the
complaint: "Every plan of merger authorized by Georgia law ... con-
tains an implied condition that the parties to it will act in good faith
and deal fairly with each other in adopting such plan."60
58. 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974) (decision under Georgia law). In holding that
the minority has a right not to be subjected to inequitable treatment on the part of the
majority shareholder, the court quoted at length from Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125
F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941) and Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939). Bryan v. Brock
& Blevins Co., Inc., 490 F.2d at 569. The court, however, was not required to decide
the standards to be used for a short-term merger. The Hon. Louis J. Lefkowitz, At-
torney General of New York, obtained a preliminary injunction to prevent the freeze-
out cash merger of Concord Fabrics, into AFW Fabrics, which Concord controls. At-
torney General Lefkowitz alleged that the merger would be inherently fraudulent, con-
trary to rules of honesty, lack a legitimate business purpose, and would freeze-out minority
shareholders. People v. Concord Fabrics, BNA SEc. RE . & L. REP. No. 307, at A-15 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County, June 12, 1975); Metz, Market Place, N.Y. Times, April 8, 1975, at 50,
col. 3; Wall St. J., April 11, 1975, at 2, col. 3. See also BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No.
309, at A-8 (July 2, 1975); Metz, Market Place, N.Y. Times, April 26, 1975, at 34, col.
4 (temporary restraining order issued to prevent freeze-out merger).
59. 490 F.2d at 570. The court did not discuss whether the claim that corporate
policy allowed only active employees to remain as shareholders rose to the level of a
valid business purpose. However, the court below viewed this alleged policy as a "scheme
and contrivance" in violation of a fiduciary trust. 343 F. Supp. 1062, 1069 (N.D. Ga.
1972).
60. 490 F.2d at 571; see United Funds, Inc. v. Carter Prods., Inc., [1961-1964
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91,288 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct. 1963). Here,
a controlling shareholder caused the board of directors of a corporation to recommend
to the shareholders an amendment to the certificate of incorporation authorizing the
corporation to issue a new class of non-voting common stock. The New York Stock Ex-
change had advised the corporation, before the requisite corporate action had occurred,
that the Exchange would take action to delist the corporation's common stock if the
proposed amendment to create non-voting common stock became effective. The court
found that the controlling shareholder breached his fiduciary duty to the minority share-
holders by acting in a manner adverse to the interests of the minority shareholders and
without a valid corporate purpose. Voting power could not be used for an ulterior
purpose adverse to the interests of the corporation and its stockholders.
The court in Bryan left unclear whether it sought to enunciate a per se rule against
the use of a new corporation to take advantage of a merger statute. See also Berkowitz v.
Power Mate Corp., BNA SEc. REG. & L. RaP. No. 309, at A-8 (N.J. Super. Ct. May 8,
1975); People v. Concord Fabrics, BNA SEC. RE. & L. REP. No. 307, at A-15 (Sup. Ct.
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In contrast, a freeze-out merger was held legal in Grimes v. Don-
aldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc.,61 in part, because the transaction served
a legitimate business purpose. The defendant corporation in the Grimes
case acquired a 57% interest in a public corporation through two tender
offers that the management of the latter entity supported. Thereafter,
such shares were transferred to a wholly owned private subsidiary of
the defendant corporation, with the intent to merge the public corpo-
ration into the private subsidiary with the 43% minority interest to be
paid in cash. In denying the plaintiff's request to enjoin the merger,
the court distinguished Bryan, finding three business reasons for the
transaction: the public corporation and the private subsidiary were
engaged in similar businesses, making a merger between the two opera-
tions a logical proposition; the continuation of a minority public inter-
est would inhibit transactions between the public corporation and the
subsidiary because of conflicts of interest flowing from the fact that
both entities were engaged in the real estate business; and certain
cost savings.62 After finding no support for the plaintiff's contention
that any time a newly formed subsidiary is created for the purpose of
facilitating a transaction the merger is per se illegal, the court con-
cluded that "the public minority shareholders . . .will be given the
fair value of their shares."63 In short, under state law a freeze-out mer-
ger must meet the tests of business purpose and fairness.
N.Y. County, June 12, 1975); Metz, Pressure Against Going Private, N.Y. Times, July
29, 1975, at 36, col. 3; Wall St. J., June 13, 1975, at 19, col. 1.
61. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 94,722 (N.D. Fla. 1974)
(decision under Delaware law).
62. Id. at 96,390. The joint cost savings totalled more than 300,000 dollars per
year. If cost savings constitutes a valid business purpose then practically any means of
going private may be sustained. See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
63. Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder)
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 94,722, at 96,391 (N.D. Fla. Jul. 15, 1974). However, the
court also indicated that a plaintiff might enjoin a freeze-out merger under Delaware
law if there is evidence of fraud or overreaching. Id.; see text accompanying notes 51-57
supra; ef. United Funds, Inc. v. Carter Prods., Inc., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEc. L. RaP. f[ 91,288 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct. 1963). Perhaps freeze-outs are
legal, "if [as in Grimes] they represent the last step in the amalgamation of two previ-
ously unrelated business organizations." Kerr, Tender Offers and Going Private-End-
ing Public Shareholding an Issue, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 16, 1974, at 43, col. 2.
In analyzing freeze-out mergers under state law, a court may also give consideration
to the manner of approval. If the action has been approved by shareholder vote and/or
a majority of disinterested directors, a business purpose test may not be involved. Corpo-
rate Purchases, 8 REv. SEC. REG. 991, 996 (1975). See also Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d
693 (Del. Ch. 1971) (approval by a committee of disinterested directors places a trans-
action between the controlling shareholders and the corporation on the same basis as if
approved by an independent third party); 4. Fraud, Use of Inside Information, Dis-
cussed at ALI-ABA Conference, BNA SEc. RaG. & L. RaP. No. 298, at A-12 to A-14
(April 16, 1975) (remarks of Kenneth J. Bialkin). However, in the Grimes case, al-
though the directors of the public corporation were not affiliated with the defendant cor-
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A dissatisfied shareholder might also challenge a freeze-out merger
or a tender offer or exchange offer under state law by alleging a breach
of other fiduciary duties including corporate opportunity,"M a denial
of equal opportunity for all shareholders 5 or use of corporate funds to
maintain or increase control.66
B. Rule lOb-5 and the Fairness Doctrine
In championing the view of many public shareholders, Commis-
sioner A. A. Sommer, Jr., has attacked going private transactions as a
freeze-out 67 of minority shareholders which cannot be squared with
poration, some were employees of the public corporation. Because of the defendant corpo-
ration's majority ownership position, they were, in the final instance, under the control
of the defendant corporation. Underpinning Grimes may also be the fact the price was
negotiated with a major, financially sophisticated shareholder who was selling his stock.
For an analysis of the inadequacy of ratification by shareholders where the parent
owns an amount of the subsidiary's stock required to approve the transaction, see Brud-
ney& Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARv. L. R.v.
297, 299-30i (1974). See also United Funds Inc. v. Carter Prods., Inc., supra, where
the controlling shareholders owned 50.38 percent of the stock, while two thirds con-
stituted the requisite majority for effecting the charter amendment. The court stated:
The position in which they [minority stockholders] were placed was unfair
to them; they had no effective freedom of volition. Under such circumstances, as
in the question of the validity of a ratification of an alleged breach of trust,
the vote of the minority stockholders who approved the amendment cannot
be taken as an independent and legally binding act.
Id. at 94,293. But 4. Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 32 A.2d 148 (Ch.
1943) (the court will give great weight to class vote by preferred shareholders in cases
involving elimination of preferred stock dividend arrearages). See also Sommer's Address
at 84,694 (concerning the "flimsiness" of the "safeguard" of disinterested directors be-
cause of the camaraderie of directors). See generally M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYr AND
REALITY (1971).
64. See, e.g., Perlnan v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S.
952 (1955). This contention could be based on the concept that a chance to go private
again is a corporate asset.
65. See, e.g., Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 592 (1969); Note, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1904 (1970). See also In re San Joaquin
Light & Power Corp., 52 Cal. App. 2d 814, 127 P.2d 29 (4th Dist. 1942); House of
Adler, Inc., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CRH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 78,515 (Sept. 30,
1971) (the SEC may have objected here because the tender offer was not made avail-
able to all shareholders, thereby depriving them of the opportunity to sell before de-
registration took place).
66. See, e.g., Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964); Bennett v.
Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962) (in making repurchases of shares to pre-
vent a change in control, insiders have the burden of proof of showing reasonable grounds
to believe that a change in control would harm the corporation). See also United Funds,
Inc. v. Carter Prods., Inc., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
91,288, at 94,281 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct. 1963).
67. A freeze-out is deemed to occur if a shareholder's interest in a public corpora-
tion is terminated by receipt of cash, or debt instruments or redeemable stock in a private
corporation. The debt securities or redeemable stock may be viewed as a payment of
cash at a future time. See also Note, Freezing Out Minority Shareholders, 74 HARV. L.
REv. 1630 (1961). For freeze-out merger cases involving private corporations, see Clarke
v. Gold Dust Corp., 106 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 671 (1940)
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the fiduciary responsibilities of majority shareowners to minority
holders. Although state laws, as interpreted by federal and state courts,
have in some instances fashioned theories which could meet the prob-
lem, Commissioner Sommer hoped that federal courts would be in-
clined to find in rule lOb-5 the basis for holding that such conduct,
which is at the heart of going private, violates the federal securities
laws. 8
The judicial expansion of rule l0b-5," which Commissioner Som-
mer hopes for, is premised on the belief that the rule embodies a fair-
ness concept.70 Three decisions by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
and several other recent cases dealing with the applicability of rule
lOb-5 to freeze-out mergers and exchange offers as means of going pri-
vate, evidence the split of judicial authority as to whether rule lOb-5
encompasses unfairness, apart from deception.
1. Background. In the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, unfairness
alone will not state a claim for relief under rule lOb-5. In Schoen-
baum v. Firstbrook,71 the court promulgated a two-fold test for viola-
tions under rule lOb-5. First, did the defendants, in inducing the trans-
action, exert a "controlling influence" 72 over the corporation and was
the transaction unfair to the corporation. Under this first standard
certain acts of a defendant may constitute an "act, practice, or course
(redeemable preferred exchanged for non-redeemable preferred); Matteson v. Ziebarth,
40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952) (redeemable preferred exchanged for com-
mon).
68. Sommer Address, supra note 1.
69. Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme,
or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact
or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975). For an analysis of the administrative history of rule
10b-5, see 1 A. BROMBERG, SECUarrIEs LAW: FRAUD SEC RULE 10b-5, § 2.2, at 22.6
(1970); Solomon & Wilke, Securities Professionals and Rule lob-5, 43 FoRDHAm L. REv.
505, 509 (1975).
70. See 3 A. BROMBE G, supra note 69, § 12.5, at 275-76. For a summary of corpo-
rate mismanagement cases, see 1 A. BROMBERG, supra, § 4.7, at 84.41-.46. See also Super-
intendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Gas. Go., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
71. 405 F.2d 215 (2d Gir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
72. The SEC has defined control in 17 G.F.R. § 240.12b-2(f) (1975); see 2 L.
Loss, SECURriEs REGULATION 770, 778-79 (2d ed. 1961); Note, The Controlling In-
fluence Standard in Rule 10b-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86 HAgv. L. Rv.
1007, 1034-35 (1973) (power to direct management decisions).
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of business which operates ... as a 'fraud."73 Second, did the insiders
deceive the corporation's shareholders. Thus, under Schoenbaum the
manipulation of securities transactions, through either deception, non-
disclosure or use of controlling influence, removes the requisite climate
of fair dealing. 4
In Popkin v. Bishop,75 the second circuit retreated from the Scho-
enbaum doctrine by holding that full disclosure to shareholders satisfies
the federal interest even if a controlling influence is used to induce an
unfair transaction. A disclosure requirement was sufficient because
"armed with the information fully disclosed under compulsion of the
federal proxy regulations and rule lOb-5 [the shareholders were]
placed in a position to sue under state law to enjoin the merger as un-
fair." 76 As the duty to disclose constitutes the principal design of sec-
tion 10(b), nondisclosure was viewed as the key issue.
Recently, in Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 7 after legiti-
mately acquiring 53% of the common stock of another corporation,
obtaining control of the board of directors of the corporation, and
engaging in a course of conduct that manipulated and depressed the
price of the other corporation's stock, the corporate defendant pro-
73. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 219-20 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane),
,cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); see Fleischer, Federal Regulation of Internal Corpo-
rate Affairs, 29 Bus. LAw. 179 S-179 (Special Issue, March, 1974); Comment, Schoen-
baum v. Firstbook: The "New Fraud" Expands Federal Corporation Law, 55 VA. L.
REv. 1103 (1969). See also Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir. 1970) (in-
vestment judgment may be impaired by deception or use of control so that "the deter-
mination of the corporation's choice of action in the transaction. .. is not made us a
reasonable man would make it if possessed of all the material information known to
the other party to the transaction").
74. See also Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 806 (5th Cir. 1970); Dasho v.
Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967).
75. 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972). The court assumed that the exchange ratio in
question was unfair. The plaintiff conceded that the defendant made "full and fair dis-
closure" of its control position and of the terms of the transaction. See Note, The Con-
Itrolling Influence Standard in Rule lOb-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86 HARv. L.
Rav. 1007, 1040 (1973). The outer limits of full disclosure are unclear, as is to whom
,disclosure must be made. The purpose of disclosure, therefore, may be placed in doubt.
76. 464 F.2d at 720 (2d Cir. 1972). The court stated that disclosure "has special
relevance to merger transactions that, under state law, must be subjected to shareholder
approval." Id. at 720. For a discussion of the infirmities of a state proceeding, includ-
ing fraud or overreaching standard, see text at 158-62.
77. 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974). No appraisal rights were involved in the merger
litigated in Schlick. For an analysis of the impact of the appraisal remedy see Brodsky,
Rights of Minority in Merger, N.Y.LJ., Dec. 12, 1974, at 1, col. 1. The decision is also
significant because in the second circuit a cause of action exists for false or misleading
proxy materials although the minority shareholders had no realistic means to affect the
outcome. The decision will probably lead to more disclosure premised on the court's
assumptions that disclosure might cause those in control to modify the terms of the
transaction and the stock market ivould revalue the shares.
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posed a merger whereby the 47% minority interest would receive stock
in the corporate defendant. After finding that the reach of section 10(b)
was broader than the type of misrepresentation or fraudulent practice
usually associated with the purchase or sale of securities, 78 the court
held that allegations as to the implementation of a scheme to defraud,
which include market manipulation and a merger on preferential
terms, stated a claim for relief under section 10(b). The requisite
material omission or misstatements relate to the fairness of a merger
proposal. Thus, in Schlick, where the element of deception was present,
specifically, where prior misrepresentations affected the market-place, a
result opposite from Popkin was reached.
2. Decisions in Going Private Cases. Whether rule lOb-5 may be
used to attack unfairness, apart from questions of misrepresentation
and non-disclosure, has constituted the main focus in three recent cases
involving going private transactions. In two freeze-out merger cased
involving publicly held corporations, the courts divided on the legality
of similar factual situations. In University Capital Corp. v. Barbara
Lynn Stores, Inc.,79 the owners of 43% of the stock of Barbara Lynn
78. 507 F.2d at 379. See also Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Gas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10-11 (1971); A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir.
1967).
79. Civil No. 4460 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1975) (consummation of merger enjoined to
allow disclosure documents to be supplemented to correct deficiencies found by the court).
But see Tanzer Economic Associates, Inc. v. Haynie, 388 F. Supp. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(favorable report need not be mentioned); Denison Mines, Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp.,
388 F. Supp. 812 (D. Del. 1974) (without disclosure of basis for opinion reference to
same may be misleading); Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.J. 1974)
(obtaining an independent appraisal not mandated). See also Green v. Santa Fe Indus.,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SE C. L. REP. 95,085 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Marshelt
v. AFW Fabrics, Corp., [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 95,219 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Greenberg v. Institutional Investor Sys., Inc., [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP. ff 95,231 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Dreier v. Music Makers Group, Inc., [1973-1974 Trans-
fer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 11 94,406 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (a plaintiff must allege
non-disclosure to state a claim under rule lOb-5). In Levine v. Biddle Sawyer Corp., 383
F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), plaintiffs objected to a short-form merger involving a!
private corporation owned 8 percent by the plaintiffs and 92 percent by the defendants.,
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants transferred their stock to a newly created,
corporation and effected a short-form merger pursuant to which the plaintiffs received
cash and the defendants all of the stock of the survivor corporation. Plaintiffs contended,
among other things, that the defendants misrepresented the value of the private corpo-.
ration and concealed financial information and certain other facts from a third party-
appraiser. The court held a claim was stated under rule 10b-5 as "misrepresentations.
and nondisclosures were made for the purpose of driving down the value made by the
third party and thereby reducing the value of the plaintiff's shares." In citing Popkin v.
Bishop, the court noted that where shareholder approval is not required, special con-.
cern will be given to the "impropriety of the conduct itself rather than on the 'failure
to disclose' it bemuse full and fair disclosure in a real sense will rarely occur." 464 F.2d
at 719. The court also noted that the amended complaint also alleged use of the short-
form merger for the sole purpose of eliminating the plaintiffs share interest.
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Stores, Inc., a publicly held corporation, transferred their shares to
Lynbar Corp., a private entity. The merger plan proposed to give $4
per share in cash to the public shareholders owning 57% of Barbara
Lynn or permit them to seek an appraisal. The insider group hoped to
operate the surviving corporation as a private entity. Although the
court noted that the creation of Lynbar and the proposed merger was
for the purpose of enabling the insiders of Barbara Lynn to buy out
the public stockholders of Barbara Lynn in order to return to the status
of a private corporation, the court, adhering to the doctrine developed
in Popkin v. Bishop, held: "Given full and adequate disclosure, the
question of what is a fair price for the stock is not a question for the
court to decide."80
However, in Albright v. Bergendahl,81 which also involved a
freeze-out merger of the shareholders of a public corporation, the court
found that the transaction constituted a "' device, scheme or artifice to
defraud' " or an "'act, practice or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit'" on the public minority share-
holders. The court concluded that the plaintiff did not have the burden
of negating a legitimate corporate purpose. The court found no legiti-
mate corporate purpose for the transaction in question because the
proxy statement only indicated that the corporation was not a viable
vehicle for the publicly held stock. Thus, under Albright, a plan to
freeze-out minority shareholders, if lacking a plausible business pur-
pose, constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty of the majority shareholders
to the minority under rule lOb-5.8 2
The sole tender offer or exchange offer case heard on the merits, to
date, is Kaufman v. Lawrence, 3 which arose out of the efforts of Wells,
80. Civil No. 4460 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1975). The litigation was settled, subject to
court approval, by a 10 percent increase in the per share price to be paid to the public
shareholders. Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1974, at 38.
81. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,997 (D.Utah Sept.
5, 1974) (memorandum decision). The court cited with approval the decisions in Bryan
v. Brock & Blevins Co., 343 F. Supp. 1062, 1068-70 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd on state law
grounds, 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974). The district court found that the sole purpose
and intent regarding the organization of the new corporation and the proposed merger
was to eliminate the plaintiff. 343 F. Supp. at 1070. The proposed merger itself was a
course of business which would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the plaintiff, in con-
nection with the sale of his stock. To allow the defendant to select arbitrarily a time in
which forcefully to exclude a minority's interest through unlawful means would not be
condoned by the court. But see Krafcisin v. LaSalle Madison Hotel Corp., [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,586 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 1972). See gen-
erally Note, Recent Developments in the Law of Corporate Freeze-outs, 14 B.C. IND.
, Com. L. REv. 1252 (1973).
82. 1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,997, at 97,453.
83. 386 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 514 F.2d 283 (2d Cir.
1975). See also Rapoport v. Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc., Civil No. 74-248 (C.D.
[Vol. 25
GOING PRIVATE
Rich, Greene, Inc., an advertising agency previously listed on the New
York Stock Exchange, to go private through an exchange offer of $3
in cash and $8 in principal amount of newly created and registered
subordinated sinking fund debentures for each share of common stock
held by the public. Insiders, holding 226,850 shares, agreed not to ex-
change their stock. In adhering to the second circuit view that a claim
for relief under rule lOb-5 must involve deception plus unfairness, the
court stated: "Whether the offer is fair or unfair or a good or bad trans-
action, however, does not raise a federal question."8 4 Secondly, the
court found the exchange offer a voluntary transaction as several alter-
natives existed for each shareholder: tender and sell the debentures at
a discount; refuse to tender; or tender and hold the debentures. In
short, a freeze-out did not exist. In addition, the court stated:
Nor does there appear to be any sizable group of shareholders op-
posed to the exchange proposal. Indeed, if such opposition does exist,
defendants' plans to go "private" will be frustrated by a sizable num-
ber of shareholders refusing to tender their shares.85
Cal., filed Jan. 30, 1974); Kreindler v. Cornwall Equities, Civil No. 74-5250 (S.D.N.Y.,
filed Dec. 2, 1974); Wall St. J., Jan. 31, 1974, at 18, col. 3; Wall St. J., Aug.
29, 1975, at 7, col. 6. In Broder v. Dane, 384 F. Supp. 1312 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), the court
on a motion for a preliminary injunction, held certain omissions in an exchange offer
material and enjoined consummation of the transaction until the corporation supplied
the missing information.
84. 386 F. Supp. at 16, citing Lewis v. Siegel, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L .REP. J 93,992 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 1973); Armour & Co. v. General Host Corp.,
296 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The Kaufman court also stated at 17:
While Sections 10(b) and 14(e) must be read flexibly, and not technically or
restrictively, see Superintendent of Life Insurance of the State of New York v.
Bankers Life and Casualty Company, 404 U.S. 6, 92 S.Ct. 165, 30 L.Ed. 2d
128 (1971); accord, Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 737 (2d Cir. 1972),
there is nothing invalid per se in a corporate effort to free itself from federal
regulations, provided the means and the methods used to effectuate that objec-
tive are allowable under the law. Nor has the federal securities law placed
profit-making or shrewd business tactics designed to benefit insiders, without
more, beyond the pale. Those laws in respect of their design and interpretive
reach, as I understand them, including the provisions relied on here, are satis-
fied if a full and fair disclosure is made, so that the decision of the holders
of WRG stock to accept or refuse the exchange offer can be said to have been
freely based upon adequate information. See Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714,
721 (2d Cir. 1972).
The preliminary injunction was also denied because the plaintiff and the class he
represents have an adequate remedy at law since money damages will make them whole.
Id. at 17. But see Broder v. Dane, 384 F. Supp. 1312 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), in which the
court states, "it is wholly consonant with congressional intent to place a heavier burden
of disclosure and fair dealing upon a corporation and its insiders who are acting in their
own behalf than would be justified were this a case involving a contested tender offer."
Id. at 1318 (emphasis added).
85. 386 F. Supp. at 17. This line of reasoning does not appear to answer a key
contention raised by Commissioner Sommer, namely, if enough shareholders tender the
market for the stock would evaporate or that in going public, a corporation makes
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C. Summary of the Judicial Response to the Going Private Problem
In the absence of a material misstatement, omission or misrepre-
sentation, a minority shareholder opposing a going private transaction
currently faces86 a difficult legal impediment to stating a claim for re-
lief under rule lOb-5. State courts, however, increasingly, but not
universally, are imposing a fiduciary duty on majority shareholders in
their dealings with minority stockowners. However, uncertainties lin-
ger regarding the elements of the obligation and the burden of proof.
Courts, if disposed to apply rule lOb-5 to corporate mismanagement
cases, presumably would look to the same standards used by state courts
under fiduciary principles: corporate purpose and price fairness. 87
The business purpose test rests on the premise that the appraisal
remedy, by itself, does not assure fairness if shareholders exchange
stock for cash. The test, therefore, focuses on fairness to the corporation.
In reality, the majority shareholders will continue to run the business
after the departure of the minority. Thus, the test imposes no real
check on the conduct of the majority in its dealings with the minority,
but instead represents a throwback to the traditional view which im-
posed a fiduciary obligation on controlling shareholders only toward
the corporation or those acting on behalf of the entity.88
an implied representation that the issuer will remain public and that the issuer or
its affiliates will not interfere with the public market for the stock. Sommer Ad-
dress, supra note 1; see Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson, 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 592 (1969); First of Michigan Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] COH FED. SEa. L.
RxP. ff 79,401 (March 29, 1973); United Funds v. Carter Prods., Inc., [1961-1964 Trans-
fer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 91,288 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct. 1963) (pros-
pectus statement that an application for a listing on the New York Stock Exchange is
pending implies a promise to maintain such a listing absent a business purpose for its
discontinuance). But see Grossman v. Cable Funding Corp., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,913 (D. Del. Dec. 16, 1974) (in response to a
shareholder contention that the corporation was using the proceeds of a public offer-
ing for purposes other than stated in the prospectus, the court found no violations of
§ 11 or § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 if the statements in the prospectus were
true at the time when made, but the passage of time rendered the specified uses unwise).
However, the funds, in any event, were used for corporate purposes. Firms going private
may use funds for the benefit of insiders. See Brodsky, Going Private, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5,
1975, at 1, col. 1.
86. A plaintiff would prefer to sue under rule lOb-5 so as to obtain certain proce-
ural advantages, including nationwide service of process, broader discovery rules, more
flexible venue requirements, and the ability to maintain a class action suit. See W. CARY,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 794-95 (4th ed. 1969).
87. Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule 10b-5 Corporate Misman-
agement Cases, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1007, 1033 n.111 (1973). See also Albright v. Ber-
gendahl, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH Fan. SEC. L. REP. 94,997 (D. Utah Sept.
5, 1974).
88. 3 L. Loss, SEcuRITIEs REGULATION 1446 (2d ed. 1961). Perhaps the strongest
corporate purpose that also fulfills broader policy considerations involves going private
through repurchase of shares by an Employee Stock Ownership Plan Trust (ESOP).
(Vol. 25
GOING PRIVATE
To overcome the conceptual problem inherent in the business pur-
pose standard, courts applying state law generally examine the fairness
of a transaction, particularly with reference to the consideration given
minority shareholders. However, the enunciation of a fairness standard,
subject to an ad hoc, retrospective interpretation by courts provides
little assistance to a corporation or its counsel in planning a transac-
tion. Few criteria exist to determine fairness because of the multitiude
of causal factors. This leads to a judgment based on evidence of value
See Solomon, Towards a Federal Policy on Work: Restructuring the Governance of
Corporations, 43 GEo. WASH. L. Rv.-(1975).
Through the ESOP financial technique, corporations enable their employees to
acquire beneficial ownership of a corporation without taking anything out of their pay-
checks or inadequate or non-existent savings. The most important aspects of ESOP
financing include a loan to an ESOP trust which qualifies as a tax-exempt employee
stock bonus trust under Section 401 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. As pres-
ently used, the trust covers a major cross section of employees in the corporation and is
controlled by a committee appointed by management which may include labor repre-
sentatives. The committee invests the loan proceeds in the corporation by buying newly
issued stock at its current market value. The trust gives its note to the lender. Pursuant
to a guarantee of the note, the corporation makes annual payments into the trust in
amounts sufficient to enable the trust to amortize its debt to the lender. The yearly pay-
ments made by the corporation to the trust are deductible by the corporation as pay-
ments to a qualified employee deferred compensation trust and are allocated propor-
tionately among accounts of the employee participants in the trust. The employees thus
acquire stock in increments over time at a price fixed when the block of stock was first
purchased. When the loan is paid off, the beneficial ownership of the stock accrues to
the employees. See Statement of Louis 0. Kelso, General Counsel and Norman G. Kur-
land, General Counsel, Bangert & Co., Hearings on S. 261 Before the Sub-Committee on
Financial Markets of the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, 93rd Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973). For an example of a repurchase transaction involving an. Employee Share
Ownership Plan see Offer to Purchase, R. B. Jones Corp., November 1, 1974. The repur-
chase is challenged in Hurwitz v. R. B. Jones Corp., Civil No. 730 W-4 (W.D.
Mo., filed Dec. 11, 1974) where plaintiffs allege, among other things, that because of
the control position of the individual defendants, they have and will continue to benefit
greatly from the establishment of the plan as they are among the highest paid employees
and therefore have a significant interest in the trust, which they have caused to be im-
plemented with company funds and are now in a position to exploit, enhance, and re-
tain their control position in administering the trust and voting the shares held therein.
Since the plan was discriminatory in the sense that certain officers and directors of the
corporation acquired greater benefits under such plan, the effect of the acquisition of
public shares was to reward these individuals with the purchased public stock. There is
also an immediate realization of gain for the insiders who, as controlling persons of
the corporation, effectuated the tender offer. Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1975, at 18, col. 3, in-
dicated that of the 573,000 shares acquired by R. B. Jones Corp., pursuant to the Offer
to Purchase, 100,000 were purchased by the company's employee trust. See also Wall St.
J., Mar. 25, 1975, at 14, col. 3. The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 provides that an 11%
tax credit may be claimed for acquisitions and construction of specified property during
the specified period, which includes the 10% tax credit and an amount equal to an
extra 105, if the corporation makes a qualified investment to an employee stock owner-
ship plan. INT. Rv. CoDn OF 1954, § 301(d). See also Hyatt, Workers' Capitalism,
Wall St. J., Apr. 29, 1975, at 44, col. 1; Thomas, Explosive Esots, BARuRON'S,
July 28, 1975, at 5; Thomas, Mighty Kelso, BARRON'S, July 21, 1975, at 3; Foress, May
1, 1975, at 32; Wall St. J., Mar. 25, 1975, at 14, col. 3; Wall St. J., July 28, 1975, at
26, col. 3; Wall St. J., July 28, 1975, at 13, col. 2.
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after the transaction, an approach that assures a surface objectivity
but little else.8 9 Finally, courts lack expertise in solving the business and
economic questions inherent in such a determination.90
Despite the facile assertions contained in Kaufman v. Lawrence,
going private through a tender offer or an exchange offer poses a po-
tential for harm to minority shareholders.91 These transactions are, in
89. 3 A. BROMBERG, supra note 69, § 16.5, at 275-76. As Bromberg concludes:
The price of such a flexible criterion as fairness includes high variability of re-
sults and large potential for dissatisfaction with them . . . . The problem be-
comes one of fair value or price, conspicuously difficult because of . . . [the]
excess of influencing factors (particularly for publicly traded securities) ....
The probable outcome is a reference to subsequent evidence of value, a hind-
sight approach that has little to recommend to it except a certain objectivity.
Given the difficulties of reconstructing values any other way, it is naive to sup-
pose that latter events will be ignored.
Id. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5567, supra note 5, at 85,091 states, "Under many
state statutes, however, questions have been raised as to whether the procedures in-
volved and the tests of fairness developed adequately protect minority security holders."
See also R. BAKER & W. GARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1551-54 (3d
ed. 1959) ; Walter, Fairness in State Court Recapitalization Plans-A Disappearing Doc-
trine, 29 B.U.L. REv. 453 (1949). See generally 3 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 919
(1965); note 71 supra. Examples of unfairness in a state corporate law context include:
a corporation which paid more than the market price for its shares (e.g., Mathes v.
Cheff, 41 Del. Ch. 166, 190 A.2d 524, (Ch. 1963), retrd on other grounds, 41 Del.
Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1964)), or that in selling stock (or exchanging its
shares in a merger) the corporation received too little (e.g., Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel
Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 296-97, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1952)).
90. One commentator has noted:
But "fairness" is an elusive standard. Where the statutory power eXists,
there is no clear and certain standard by which the chancellor can allow its
exercise for some purposes and disallow its exercise for others. The quest
for "fairness" also leads the chancellor into new fields where he is normally
not expert. It places on him the heavy burden of solving complex economic
problems in order to formulate a judgment as to soundness, and hence the
fairness, of the proposed amendment.
Gibson, How Fixed Are Class Shareholder Rights?, 28 LAW, a CONTEMP. PRon. 283,
296 (1958).
91. Apparently, the theory is that shareholders retain the option to hold the stock
and participate equally with management. Although short-form freeze out mergers are
legal under state law, they may be challenged under rule lOb-5. Levine v. Biddle Sawyer,
383 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Similarly, under a long-form merger statute, share-
holder votes may be rendered ineffective if the insiders control the requisite percentage.
The merger may be attacked on federal grounds. See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie, 567 F.2d
374 (2d Cir. 1974). For an attack on state law grounds, see United Funds, Inc. v. Car-
ter Prods., Inc., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. g 91,288, at
94,281 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct. 1963). It could be argued that no limitations should
be placed on going private as it constitutes an additional reward to entrepreneurs. For a
discussion of the relationship between entrepreneurial compensation and insider deal-
ings, see H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 131-46 (1966). The
concept of entrepreneurship may have some validity in going private situations since
insiders usually have a substantial ownership position in the firms that attempt such
transactions. However, the need to prevent overreaching and to preserve public confi-
dence requisite for investors to place funds, especially in new ventures, seems paramount.
For an argument that shareholders assumed the risk because of certain identifiable fac-
tors, see N.Y. Times, December 13, 1974, at 70, col. 3; 280 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP.
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fact, probably not voluntary and, thus, should be viewed under a more
searching light. As Commissioner Sommer noted, "Is there not a clear
conffict of interest when the shareholders are offered the empty choice
of tendering or being forced out one way or another while the con-
trolling shareholders reap benefits." 92 No real choice exists-if a suffi-
cient number of shareholders tender or exchange their shares, the re-
maining public shareholders face a market even more illiquid (and
probably a lower price-earning multiple for their shares), stemming,
in large measure from the small number of outstanding shares in
public hands.9 3 To the reduced float 94 must also be added the threat
or the reality of delisting and deregistration of the shares. Although the
expressed intention of a broker-dealer to continue to make a market
in the firm's stock may seemingly counter this argument, 95 such as-
surance may prove ephemeral.96 The notion that shareholders, in the
exercise of their theoretical sovereignty, will reject management pro-
A-8 (Dec. 4, 1974). For the proposition that every consideration of equity argues for a
categorical prohibition against the freeze-out, see Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares
in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARv. L. REy. 297, 323 n.56 (1974). It is im-
portant, however, to note the trend towards a contract, not a vested rights theory of
share ownership. See note 59 supra.
92. Sommer Address at 84,698. Sommer also put the shareholder's plight in pic-
turesque language:
Faced with the prospect of a force-out merger, or a market reduced to
glacial activity and the liquidity of the Mojave Desert, and deprived of most
of the benefits of the federal securities laws, how real is the choice of the
shareholder confronting the offer of management to acquire his shares, usually
not with their own resources, but with the corporation's resources that really
belong to him and his fellow shareholders? In short, he usually decides he
damn well better take the money and run.
Id. at 84,696.
93. Hershman, Going Private-or How to Squeeze Investors, DUN'S REV., Jan.,
1975, at 38.
94. An adequate float, that is, a sufficient number of shares in the hands of the
public as opposed to the corporate insiders, permits a more orderly trading market in an
issuer's security.
95. Wells-Rich Prospectus at 16, states that the corporation's investment banker
indicated an intention to maintain an over-the-counter market in the common stock, if
delisted from the New York Stock Exchange. The Wells, Rich, Greene, Inc., plan can be
compared with the plan of Cornwall Equities, Ltd., which made no arrangements for an
over-the-counter market for the company's stock. Anreder, Up and Down Wall Street,
BARRON'S, Dec. 2, 1974, at 40, col. 2. After the exchange offer in Wells, Rich, Greene,
Inc. approximately 1,200 out of 2,117 shareholders remained. Of the shares, 165,000 were
tendered and only 465,463 were outstanding (including 265,052 held by insiders).
Scheibla, supra note 19, at 24, col. 3. See also Brief for Defendants-Appellees, at 3, 8,
Kaufman v. Lawrence, 514 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975); Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant
at 6-7, Kaufman v. Lawrence, supra.
96. On a number of trading days since Wells, Rich, Greene, Inc., was traded on
the over-the-counter market, no shares have been traded. Scheibla, supra note 19, at 22,
col. 5. Trading in the common stock of Wells, Rich, Greene, Inc., was so light that none
of the major newspapers carried the bid-asked quotes. Reply Brief for the Plaintiff-Ap-
pellant at 6-7, Kaufman v. Lawrence, 514 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975).
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posals also seems misplaced in light of shareholder attitudes toward
securities and management's control of the disclosure machinery. 7
Thus, the search for legal standards and modes to prevent overreach-
ing by the majority continues.
IV PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
The SEC has commenced a public investigatory and rule-making
proceeding to ascertain facts, conditions, practices and other matters
relating to going private transactions. The purpose of the proceeding
is to develop a factual basis for determining "whether it is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors
for the Commission" to adopt rules under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 on the basis of the proposed rules and/or to recommend fur-
ther legislation to Congress.98 To provide a framework for the hear-
ings and the comments solicited by the SEC the Commission proposed
two different rules to deal with going private transactions.
Proposed rule 13e-3A 99 would render unlawful certain purchases
97. On the motivation of shareholders, cf. Solomon, supra note 3, at 761, 763
(1974). See also Pacey, supra note 8, at 3, col. 1, which indicates that stockbrokers
usually advised acceptance of corporate offers in going private transactions.
98. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5567, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. ff 80,104, at 85,089 (Feb. 6, 1975).
When the Commission commenced its rule making, many corporations withdrew
their disclosure documents involving going private transactions. See the decision, among
others, of Cornwall Equities, Ltd., to halt repurchase of shares. Scheibla, supra note 19,
at 9, cols. 1, 2. See also Kerr, Tender Offers and Going Private-Ending Public Share-
holding an Issue, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 16, 1974, at 25, col. 3, regarding staff requirements
in letter of comment on proxy or information statement filed under regulations 14A and
14C. From Nov. 14, 1974 to Feb. 6, 1975, the Commission refused to issue any com-
ments on disclosure materials for corporations going private. After Feb. 6, 1975, the staff
resumed making comments presumably on the basis that the Commission's members do
not consider going private per se illegal, but as the rulemaking indicates, the Commis-
sion's position is far from clear. See comments in Scheibla, supra, note 19, at 9, col. 2,
of Commissioner John R. Evans (who is reported as stating "any company going private
now runs the usual risk that SEC staff comments will not hold up and that the trans-
action may be illegal, although the SEC does not consider going private illegal per se.")
and former Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr. ("We are urging companies to consider the items
in the proposed rulemaking. Some are attempting to comply with proposals for disclosure
and for obtaining two appraisals of the offer. But they should consult their counsels and
make their own determinations. I cannot tell them precisely what to do because we have
not yet come up with our decision. We have found the problem too complex for quick
action."). Commissioner Sommer has stated that letters of comment and grants of ac-
celeration are "pouring out," at least in cases where the staff "does not have reason to
think an investigation is merited." 294 BNA SEC. REc. & L. REP. No. 294, at D-2 (Mar.
19, 1975).
See generally Scheibla, supra note 19, at 9, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1975, at 39,
col. 4; Bacon, SEC Moving to Protect Minority Holders When Firms Buy Up Shares,
"Go Private", Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 1975, at 12, col. 2.
99. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5567, supra note 5, at 85,091, 85,093; 2 COH
Fa. SEc. L. REp. 23,704 (1975).
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of an issuer's equity securities and certain proxy solicitations in con-
nection therewith, unless the issuer or its affiliates complies with spe-
cific disclosure and substantive provisions. In addition to providing
for a 20 day waiting period during which time certain transactions
could not be affected, specified information 0 0 must be mailed to all
holders of record and all known beneficial owners of the affected class
of equity securities. The proposed rule also requires that the considera-
tion offered constitute fair value as determined, in good faith, by both
the issuer (or its affiliate) and a joint recommendation of two qualified
independent persons. The consideration offered could not be less than
the joint recommendation. A fair and adequate summary, among other
things, of the reports, opinions and joint recommendation would be
included in the information statement as well as a fair and adequate
summary of any appraisal obtained by or for the issuer or its affiliate
regarding the issuer, its material assets, or securities within the last
two years. 10' The proposed rule also includes certain substantive re-
quirements including a "take-out" of the remaining security holders
after deregistration 02
This proposal appears deficient in two respects. First, disclosure is
probably of limited utility in going private situations. The disclosure
concept is premised on supplying an investor with sufficient informa-
tion to make an investment decision, and serving as a glaring light of
publicity which may prevent a fraudulent transaction by an unscrupu-
lous management. 03 However, in reality, informed investment deci-
100. The requisite information would include: the source of funds for the trans-
action, the purposes of the transaction and the intentions with respect to the future
conduct of business, background information regarding affiliates, an opinion of counsel
respecting the legality of the transaction, certain financial information, recent acquisi-
tions of securities, dividend and market price information, and a summary of an evalua-
tion by two qualified independent persons of the consideration offered. 2 CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 23,704, at 17,245-4 to -6 (1975).
101. Id. at 17,245-5, 17,245-6. The proposal would permit the appraisers to
consider, among other factors, the value of the assets and the earning power of the is-
suer. Id. at 17,245-6.
102. Id. at 17,245-7. The provisions regulating the details of shareholder notifica-
tion, withdrawal, pro rata acceptance, increase in consideration for tendered securities
comport with standards of the Williams Act, Securities Exchange Act §§ 13(d), 14(d),
14(e), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(4), 78n(d), 78n(e) (1970).
103. For background on disclosure concepts embodied in the Securities Act of
1933, see 1 L. Loss, SECURrrIES REGULATION 121-28 (2d ed. 1961); 4 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 2270-75 (1969); SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A Rx-
APPRAISAL OF' FEDERAL ADMINIsTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE 1933 AND 1934 ACTS
(1969); Wheat, The Philosophy and Policies of the SEC's Disclosure Policy Study, in
PLI FIRST ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 4 (1970); Anderson, The
Disclosure Process in Federal Securities Regulation: A Brief Review, 25 HASTINGS L. J.
311 (1974); Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Rules, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 408, 410-11
(1962); Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 29 (1959).
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sions come about through a filtration process involving securities pro-
fessionals. 104
In the current stock market, which is dominated by institutional
investors,'0 5 security analysts, who would perform the filtration func-
tion, increasingly follow a limited range of securities held or of in-
terest to institutions.' 6 Corporations which have gone private or are
104. As Professor Homer Kripke has indicated:
The heart of my position is that the intelligent investor (unless he is
himself a market professional) who tries to act in any informed way does so
by getting at least part of his information second hand, filtered through pro-
fessionals. The concept that a prospectus enables the investor to act in informed
fashion without professional aid is a delusion ....
Kripke, The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. Rv.
1151, 1165 (1970). Kripke sets forth his reasons in id. at 1167-70. See also Kripke,
The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 Bus. LAW. 631, 632-33 (1973).
"Analysts do, in fact, generate the recommendations that influence the great pre-
ponderance of investment decisions of institutions and of individuals." Parker, A Profes-
sional's Thoughts-Needed Information, 24 Bus. LAW. 63, 64 (1968). See generally
Address by former chairman Bradford Cook, American Society of Corporate Secretaries,
[1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ff 79,341. Commissioner Irving Pollack
has noted, "There may be instances where disclosure is not enough." Scheibla, supra
note 19, at 30, col. 3.
105. Solomon, supra note 3, at 768-72 (1974). See also Cole, Institution Dollar
Volume 69% of Big Board's Total, N.Y. Times, April 2, 1975, at 55, col. 2.
106. See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 3, at 773-74. However, certain bank trust de-
partments have diversified their holdings by placing funds into smaller corporations. Id.
at 774. See also Metz, Market Place: Investing in Small Companies, N.Y. Times, Feb.
14, 1975, at 52, cols. 3, 4. Metz states:
Yet a recent study suggests that the biggest institutional investors-par-
ticularly the banks and the largest mutual fund organizations-are main-
taining an interest in small promising companies and continue to support their
shares.
On the other hand, the study showed that the research departments of the
various institutional investors and brokerage firms were indeed studying fewer
companies than they had in the past.
Id. at 52, cols. 3, 4.
For an analysis of the impact of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1975), on institutional investing, particularly on the
fiduciary standards (29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (B) states that fiduciaries must act "with
the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a
prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the
conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims"), see Shakin, Tough on
Fiduciaries, BARRON's, Dec. 16, 1974, at 11, col. 1. Shakin states:
Moreover, the requirement of prudence in selecting securities for a pen-
sion fund portfolio may incline managers to pass up those of many smaller
companies-or even larger ones-which do not possess the solid balance sheet
of a Campbell Soup, for instance.
However, it appears that the need for investment caution will ac-
celerate the tendency-which has been underway for some time-to shy away
from smaller, unseasoned companies.
Id. at 11, col. 5; see Nassau, Danger: Fiduciaries Warned to Perform as "Prudent
Experts," N.Y.L.J., Sept. 23, 1974, at 25, col. 3. See also Steinberger, Fiduciary Respon-
sibilities in Employee Benefit Plans, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 28, 1975, at 1, col. 3; cf. Note, Fi-
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contemplating such transactions lack institutional sponsorship.10 7 Prior
to going private, the market for the securities of such corporations
lacked liquidity. 08 To talk of a filtration process through disclosure
in such a situation is simply to close one's eyes to reality.
The use of two independent, qualified persons to arrive at a joint
recommendation attempts to overcome the fairness of price obstacle.
The question turns on whether the process should be left to appraisers
or should be handled as part of SEC administrative proceeding. Use of
appraisals 9 involves a problem of professionalism, particularly defining
who is qualified.1 0 The reports, moreover, probably would lack uni-
duciary Standards and the Prudent Man Rule under the Employment Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974, 88 HAxv. L. REv. 960 (1975).
107. Metz, Market Place: Investing in Small Companies, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1975,
at 52, col. 3.
108. See, e.g., Wells-Rich Prospectus at 4 (stock lightly traded) ; Proxy Statement
of Barbara Lynn Stores, Inc., Oct. 8, 1974, at 11 (limited investor interest and light
public trading); Offer to Purchase of Diversified Design Disciplines, Inc., Aug. 1, 1974,
at 4 (lack of demand for stock); Proxy Statement (draft) of The North Central Com-
panies, Inc., Oct. 1974, at 9 (low trading volume); Offer to Purchase of R. B. Jones
Corp., Nov. 1, 1974, at 6 (extremely limited public market). One corporate executive
expressed the dilemma as follows:
"We were neither fish nor fowl when we were public," Mr. [John) Sherman
[controller, Nardis of Dallas, Inc.] says. "We never had a large enough float
(of outstanding stock) to entice some large firms to take an interest in us.
We tried making acquisitions, but we found being public was a disadvantage
because most of the firms we talked to were private themselves and didn't want
to get involved with disclosure."
Freeman, Going Private, Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1974, at 21, col. 3.
Usually firms seeking to go private evidenced four factors: they went public in
1969; have under 500,000 shares in public hands; one family, the employees, or a com-
bination of a family and the employees own many shares; and the firm itself has the
cash or the ability to borrow the necessary funds. Pacey, supra note 8, at 3, col. 1.
A liquid market exists when transactions in the stock of an issuer can take place
without the price of a security experiencing sudden, sharp fluctuations in the absence
of material information on a volume deemed "light." An illiquid market is characterized
by such price swings. See Solomon, Institutional Investors: Stock Market Impact and
Corporate Control, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 776-77 (1974). See also Elia, Heard
on the Street, Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 1975, at 31, col. 3.
109. See generally the problems of projections, Beecher v. Able, 374 P. Supp. 341
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5362, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,211 (Feb. 2, 1973); Kripke, The SEC, The Accountants,
Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1151, 1200 (1970); Mann, Pro-
spectuses: Unreadable or Just Unread?-A Proposal to Reexamine Policies Against
Permitting Projections, 40 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 222 (1971); Schneider, Financial Nits,
Grits, and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L. Rav. 254, 274-83 (1972);
Comment, Fearless Forecasts: Corporate Liability for Earnings Forecasts that Miss the
Mark, 16 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 115 (1974). For the Commission's traditional policy
against disclosure of asset appraisals in proxy statements, see Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo,
Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1291-94 (2d Cir. 1973). For SEC proposals to implement SEC's
statements on projections see SEC Securities Act Release No. 5581, 300 BNA SEc. REo.
& L. RE'. H-1 (April 30, 1975). See also Belair, Forecast Rules Offered by SEC, N.Y.
Times, April 29, 1975, at 43, col. 4; Wall St. J., April 29, 1975, at 2, col. 3.
110. See Comment, The Use of Appraisals in SEC Documents, supra note 30, at
138, 151 (suggesting that an appraiser must hold a senior designation of a recognized ap-
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formity as accepted appraisal methods do not exist. 1 , The absence of
a single set of accepted appraisal principles deprives the Commission
of a standard against which to test the accuracy and honesty of figures
furnished by different appraisers using different methods. The lack of
uniformity could be overcome either by the SEC or the appraisal pro-
fession, more rigorously prescribing approved methods of appraisal.
Also, under the proposed rule, the selection of and the payment for
the appraiser remains in the hands of the issuer or its affiliates. 12
Finally, even in the face of two appraisals, a shareholder could mount
a challenge to the transaction which would again be subjected to a
retrospective interpretation by the Commission or the courts.
In addition to all or some of the disclosure and tender offer re-
quirements contained in Proposed rule 13e-3A, Proposed rule
l3e-B"18 would apply to certain specified consequences that would or
are intended to occur. Proposed rule 13e-3B would require that the
terms of a transaction, including any consideration to be paid to any
affected security holder, be fair, and in the case of a transaction by an
issuer, that a valid business purpose exist for the transaction. Appar-
ently, before clearing the appropriate disclosure documents, the Com-
mission would make a determination regarding business purpose and
fairness. In addition to the unsoundness of a business purpose test 14
and the inapplicability of the disclosure concept,"5 the proposal is
notably imprecise.
CONCLUSION
It is recommended that the Securities and Exchange Commission
enact regulations" 6 vesting the Commission, in the situations and un-
praisal society). See also [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] COCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 80,104,
at 85,093, (Feb. 6, 1975) where the SEC raises the questions dealing with the qualifi-
cations, methods of selection, and standards of independence for persons making the
evaluations. The requirement of a joint appraisal may destroy the independence of each
appraiser.
111. Comment, The Use of Appraisals in SEC Documents, supra note 30, at 138,
152-53 (suggests that professional appraisal societies be encouraged to develop a single
set of accepted appraisal principles).
112. Metz, Stockholder Opposes Going-Private Plan, N.Y. Times, April 12, 1975, at
34, col. 3 (appraiser selected because he asked for lowest fee).
113. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5573, [1974-1975 Transfer Bonder] CCH Fa.
SEC. L. REP. ff 80,104, at 85,093 (Feb. 6, 1975). See also Investment Company AcT. §
17(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(b) (1970), for a comparison in regards to the fairness re-
quirement.
114. See text at 168.
115. See text at 173.
116. The Commission appears to possess the power to promulgate this proposed
rule on the basis of Sections 2 and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The
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der the terms and conditions set forth below, with the authority to
make determinations regarding an issuer's proposal to go private. An
issuer or an affiliate thereof seeking to engage in certain transactions
117
would notify the SEC and each record holder and beneficial owner
known to such issuer or affiliate. The notice would briefly describe
the proposed transaction, its impact on the affected class of sharehold-
ers and the type and amount of consideration to be given to the hold-
ers of the affected equity securities. A shareholder could then, within
a short period of time (10 to 20 days), file a statement with the Com-
mission regarding the fairness of the consideration. Whether or not
any such objections were filed by shareholders, the staff of the Commis-
sion would proceed to hold an administrative hearing regarding the
fairness of the consideration offered. The burden of proving fairness
would be placed on an issuer or an affiliate. After the hearing, the staff
would prepare a report containing its independent evaluation on the
"fairness" question and making a recommendation regarding the terms
and conditions of the consideration to be offered. If the issuer or its
affiliate disapproved of the staff's recommendation, the issuer or its
legislative history of both sections is exceedingly scanty. H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 32-33 (1934), states, regarding Section 10(b), "it is made unlawful to use or
employ any such device or continuance in 'contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors"' (emphasis added). See also 5 A. S. JAcoBs, THE IMPACT
OF RULE 10b-5 § 35.01 (1974). On the purpose of Section 2 see Smolowe v. Delendo
Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 1943). See also BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. A-1, at
A-2 (Sept. 10, 1975) (authority exists under Section 13(e) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934). But see Letter from Sullivan and Cromwell to George A. Fitzsimmons,
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, March 14, 1975. See generally Loomis,
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 28
GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 214 (1959); Tracy & MacChesney, The Securities Exchange Act
1934, 32 MicH. L. REv. 1025 (1934). For a summary of the unsuccessful challenges to
the constitutionality of rule lOb-5, see A. JACOBs, THE IMPACT OF RULE lob-5 § 12
(1974). For a layman's analysis of the problem regrding the SEC's powers, see Bus-
INESS WEEx, Feb. 24, 1975, at 104 ("The commission should stop sucking its thumb
and clamp down hard on going private").
117. These transactions, including purchase, cash tender offer, exchange offer,
merger, sale of assets, and reverse stock split, are those which (1) compel a security
holder of the issuer to terminate his equity interest in an issuer; (2) substantially
reduce the amount of any class of an issuer's outstanding equity prior to the trans-
action and held beneficially by persons other than the issuer; and (3) cause (i) a class
of equity securities of an issuer to be subject to delisting from a national securities ex-
change, (ii) a class of equity securities to be eligible for termination of registration
(Section 12(g) (4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), (iii) an issuer to be eligible
for suspension of reporting obligations (Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934), and (iv) a class of the issuer's equity securities authorized to be quoted in an
inter-dealer quotation system of a national securities association to cease to be authorized.
Compare this category of transactions with the type of transactions covered under Pro-
posed Rules 13e-3A and 13e-3B, 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 111 23,704, 23,705 (1975).
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affiliate could drop the proposed transaction."81 A dissatisfied share-
holder who had previously filed an objection to the original proposal
could seek a review of the staff's recommendation by the entire Com-
mission,"19 thus laying the basis for judicial review. In the absence of
a veto by the issuer or its affiliate or a further challenge by a dissatis-
fied shareholder, the staff's recommendation would be disseminated, on
a specified form, to the shareholders who could then accept or reject
the proposal. The Commission would also retain the right to later en-
join a transaction, even upon the terms and conditions specified by it,
should material facts later develop.
This method affords several advantages. It would offer a prospec-
tive judgment by the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission
based on the business, financial and economic expertise 20 of an inde-
pendent body, applying, hopefully, more uniform standards. The oppo-
tunity for later second guessing in future judicial or administrative pro-
ceedings, especially if a corporation prospers, is eliminated. The costs
for the participants would probably be lower in the administrative
hearing as opposed to retrospective judicial proceedings.
At least three objections exist to the outlined procedure: money
and manpower, time'2 ' and lack of standards. 22 As to the first point,
118. In such a case, an issuer or its affiliate would be required to wait a specified
period before resubmitting a "going private" proposal.
119. Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (court declined to review
because only a staff report rather than a Commission order was involved).
120. The SEC, as an administrative agency, assists federal courts in the field of
corporate reorganization. Under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act of 1938, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 572, 608 (1970), the SEC at the request of or with the approval of the court, acts
as a participant in the proceedings thereunder in order to provide, for the court and
investors, independent, expert assistance on materials arising in such proceedings and to
prepare, for the benefit of the courts and investors, formal advisory reports on the plans
of reorganization submitted to it by the court in such proceedings. See 10 SEC ANN. RaP.
141-52 (1944); 6 W. COLEIR, BANKRUPTCY 7.01, at 1154-55 (14th ed. 1972) ; Frank,
Epithetical Jurisprudence and the Work of the Securities and Exchange Commission in
the Administration of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 18 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rnv. 317
(1941); Gerdes, Recent Developments in Corporate Reorganization Under the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 26 VA. L. Ray. 999, 1010-13 (1940). The Investment Company Act of
1940 § 17 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (a) (1970), prohibits certain transactions, for example,
the purchase or sale of securities or other properties, between a registered investment
company and certain affiliated persons. The Securities and Exchange Commission, pur-
suant to the Investment Company Act § 17(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(b), may exempt
such a transaction by an order after a hearing, if the evidence, among other items, es-
tablishes that "the terms of the proposed transaction, including the consideration to be
paid or received, are reasonable and fair and do not involve overreaching on the part
of any person concerned." Investment Company Act § 17(b) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
17(b)(1) (1970).
121. See, e.g., Bacon, The Regulators: Federal Commissions Are Masters of Delay
on Cases Before Them, Wall St. J., Oct 15, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
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any corporations desirous of engaging in a specified transaction would
be required to pay the expenses (salaries of staff and support person-
nel, other experts, administrative overhead, out of pocket costs) in-
curred by the Commission in conducting an administrative hearing and
preparing a report.12 3 Regarding the delay often encountered in Fed-
eral regulatory inquiries, the Commission would be required to formu-
late its report within a specified, but brief, time period. Finally, over a
period of time standards would develop regarding the fairness of the
type and amount of consideration. 124 As to the question of valuation,
the guidelines remain to be charted, but perhaps all that can be ex-
pected is an educated, but more consistent, guess. 25
122. On substantive administrative discretion and case-to-case method of adjudi-
cation, see Reich, The New Property, 73 YaE L.J. 733, 749-50, 782-83 (1964). See also
J. MorsKY, BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEw BUSINESS PROMOTIONS 15 (1971).
123. But see Solomon & Wilke, Securities Professionals and Rule lOb-5, 43 FoRD-
HAM L. REv. 505, 545 (1975) (proposal for industry-wide funding).
124. In formulating standards regarding price fairness, the Commission faces a
multitude of possibilities regarding valuation-market price, historic market prices, asset
appraisal, book value, capitalization of earnings, plans and prospects for the corporation
and/or industry. Consideration should also be given to the following: post-transactional
benefits, including the rewards to be received by the insiders, and the potential for future
enhancement in value and cost savings. SEC Securities Act Release No. 11,231, [1974-
1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,104 (Feb. 6, 1975); see Brudney
& Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HAgv. L. REv. 297
(1974). One commentator has suggested the granting of warrants to shareholders so that
they may continue to participate, even though they no longer own an equity interest, if
the corporation, within a specified time period, goes public again, or merges so as to
become public again. See Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 929-30 (1975). The
former public shareholders might also share in the liquidation or sale of the corporation
if effectuated within a specified time period.
For an analysis of capitalization rates, adjustments to past earnings and base
periods in corporate reorganization proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act, see gen-
erally Gardner, The SEC and Valuation under Chapter X, 91 U. PA. L. R~v. 440,
441, 449-50, 454-56 (1943). For another approach to the definition of fairness, see Latty,
Fairness-The Focal Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimination, 29 VA. L. REy. 1
(1942).
125. Jerome N. Frank (former SEC Commissioner and later Judge on the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals) noted:
A conclusion as to value is, in last analysis, an expression of judgment.
The "facts", in such cases, are not rigid, inert, purely "objective" data. Even
in the most exact sciences, a fact usually involves an interpretation, an hy-
pothesis or theory. As I have said elsewhere, "Of course, there is no such thing
as mere pure observation or description. Looking and reporting are always
selective and purposive." "A 'fact' is a synthesis. A ... description is . . . in-
terpretative." "The arts of the lawyer and the judge involve daily dealing with
uncertainties, contingencies, imponderables, unpredictables. Were that not
true, life would be simple for clients, judges, lawyers .... "
Frank., Epithetical jurisprudence and the Work of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission in the Administration of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 18 N.Y.U.L. Q. Rv.
317, 338-39 (1941) (footnotes omitted). Bromberg has characterized the process as the
"metaphysics of value." 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 69, § 6.3(900), at 122.16.
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